


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Significant Dates ▶

[ASTERISK denotes ANNIVERSARIES. All others are CURRENT EVENTS]

MAY

- 16* Treaty of Aigan, first of "Unequal Treaties," cedes Chinese Territory east of Amur River to Russia. Treaty never ratified, but confirmed by Treaty of Peking, 14 November 1860. 1858.
- 22 Soviet All-Union Writers' Congress scheduled to convene, Moscow.
- 25* Josip Broz Tito born. 1892. SEVENTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY
- 28-31 Pacem in Terris, Second Convocation, Geneva. (Officially sponsored by Center for Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara. Financial support from Investors Overseas Services.)

JUN

- 1 International Childrens' Day, celebrated by Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF; Communist front).
- 5* Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposes European Recovery Plan ("Marshall Plan") in speech at Harvard. 1947. TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 11-12* Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other top Red Army generals arrested; later tried secretly and executed. 1937. THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 16* First Congress of Soviets (Councils of Workers; and Soldiers' Deputies) meets; only 137 out of 1090 members are Bolsheviks. 1917. FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY.
- 16-17* East German workers and youths demonstrate and riot, quelled by Soviet troops. (Commemorated annually in West Germany as German Day of Unity.) 1953.
- 17* Hungarian government announces trial and execution of Imre Nagy, Premier during Hungarian revolt who had been seized in violation of promise of safe-conduct. 1958.
- 22* Germany invades the Soviet Union. 1941.
- 25* North Korean army crosses 38th parallel, invading South Korea, 1950.
- 28-29* Demonstration by Poznan workers against wage abuses turns into riot; Polish government crushes riot, killing 44, wounding hundreds, though later moves to correct abuses. 1956.
- 28 Opening of International Union of Architects (UIA) Congress, Prague, followed by International Meeting of Women Architects, Bratislava. (UIA is basically professional, not a front, but meeting in Havana in 1963 exploited by Communists.

JUL

- 1* Dominion of Canada established, uniting provinces under federal government. 1867. CENTENARY.
- 6-9 World Conference on Vietnam, Stockholm. (Communist fronts involved include World Peace Council and International Organization of Journalists; non-Communist World Conference of World Peace Through Law also participating.)
- 9-14 World Conference of World Peace Through Law. Conference in Geneva.

Media Lines

27 March 1967

African Nations Resent NCNA Distortions. Several independent African governments have been seriously disturbed during the past year by the distortion of statements of leading African statesmen in news releases of the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY (NCNA). Last summer NCNA twisted a statement of President Nyerere of Tanzania in which he stressed that "imperialism" should not be exclusively equated with the Western Powers: In NCNA's version, Nyerere said exactly the opposite -- that "the reality of imperialism is Western imperialism." President Kaunda of Zambia, who had warned in an important October 1965 speech of the imperialist aspirations of Red China and other Communist countries, was reported instead by NCNA to have attacked the West. Such false reporting has recently led to the banning of the dissemination of NCNA dispatches by the Government of Tunisia. A week before the ban was put into effect in February, NCNA reported that "Tunisians from all walks of life have praised Chairman Mao as the greatest revolutionary genius and a standard bearer of the liberation and progress of mankind".

27 March 1967

Briefly Noted



27 March 1967

*Does It Fear
Being "Over-
come" Itself?*

East German Regime
Chagrined By U.S.
Folk Music Popularity

American folk singers, for example Joan Baez and Pete Seeger, frequently function as social critics of the American scene. This circumstance sometimes encourages the Communists to feature such singers at meetings under their sponsorship in the United States and abroad. But social criticism knows no national borders. When the songs of American folk singers are introduced to the Communist World, it is natural that they should be "adapted" to local conditions by the disillusioned people of these countries.

The attached clipping from the 5 March NEW YORK TIMES reports on the reaction of the East German Satellite regime to "We Shall Overcome," introduced to East Berlin by Pete Seeger. This illustrates a fundamental point: that while the Communists encourage protest in free countries, they cannot tolerate any limit of protest in their own bailiwicks. This incident (and any similar ones) might be used to contrast toleration outside the Bloc with the still-existing totalitarianism within it. This case is also one more indicator of the growing isolation of East Germany from progressive developments in music, drama, literature, and all other phases of life in the Free -- or even the East European -- World.

* * *

*But No
Milk*

Castro Gives 'Em Cir-
cuses and Ice Cream

Fidel Castro apparently doesn't read GRANMA, the Cuban Communist Party's newspaper. In a speech to Havana steelworkers on 21 February he bragged that 26 flavors of ice cream are being produced and that soon the number will be increased to 40 or 42. He also said: "in the dairy industry we will produce dozens of varieties of cheeses; at this moment we have almost 30 comrades in various European nations studying the techniques of cheese production... And we are going to produce all the most famous varieties of cheeses."

But only slightly less than three weeks before his speech, more precisely on 4 February, GRANMA carried an article noting that in Camaguey Province there had been a serious milk shortage since at least last November. According to the article, the province was short 80,000 kilos in December and in order to reduce this deficit all cheese and yogurt production had been stopped. Nevertheless, by mid-January the shortage had risen to 110,000 kilos, which required the adoption of emergency measures to ensure that children from one to six received milk; presumably there was not enough for anyone else. While no

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(Briefly Noted Con't)

production figures were given for the first of February, one can assume that the situation had further deteriorated since the 4 February article announced the dismissal of the provincial milk enterprise director, his deputy, and the official in charge of distribution.

(The pertinent excerpt from Castro's speech and the GRANMA article are attached.)

* * *

<i>Appointment</i>	<u>Cuban Intelligence</u>
<i>Appropriate</i>	<u>Official Named</u>
<i>to Respon-</i>	<u>Deputy Foreign</u>
<i>sibilities</i>	<u>Minister</u>

The appointment of Captain Carlos Chain Soler as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was announced in GRANMA on 17 February 1967 (copy of article attached). That same day he was presented to the diplomatic corps in Havana.

GRANMA summarized Chain Soler's background: arrested by Batista in 1956; provincial coordinator of the 26th of July Movement in Camaguey and later Oriente Provinces during the resistance against Batista; after the revolution held various posts in Oriente Province; and was alternate delegate to the OAS. The final sentence in the GRANMA article notes that his latest employment was a high position in the Ministry of Interior. Cuban exile publications have clearly stated that Chain Soler was in fact for several years deputy chief of the Cuban foreign intelligence service, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) under Manuel Pineiro; in 1965 he became a senior aide to Ramiro Valdes, the Minister of

Interior, who is in charge of all Cuban intelligence activities.

This appointment should not be surprising to observers of Cuban foreign affairs; after all, Cuba has very few diplomatic relations of the ordinary sort. The overwhelming part of its foreign activities involves clandestine action, whether it be smuggling arms into Latin America or running extensive guerrilla training schools for "national liberation movements" in Africa.

Appropriately enough, the first foreign diplomat to congratulate Chain Soler was the doyen of the diplomatic corps in Havana, Soviet Ambassador Alexei Ivanovich Alekseyev, well known as a high KGB official.

* * *

<i>Pre-</i>	<u>Novy Mir Replaces</u>
<i>Writers'</i>	<u>Two Editors</u>
<i>Conference</i>	
<i>Maneuver?</i>	

NOVY MIR (New World), liberal Soviet intellectual monthly, was in the news again on 3 March, this time over the dismissal of two editors, A. G. Dementiev and B.G. Zaks. Dementiev, who was one of two deputy chief editors, is said to have been dismissed because he ignored recent official policy prescribing a truce on the subject of Stalin's role in Soviet history, and instead decided to go ahead and publish the memoirs of Konstantin Simonov. Simonov, an outstanding Soviet writer and himself a former editor of NOVY MIR, severely criticized the late dictator in his memoirs. (The memoirs were later deleted from the journal.)

NOVY MIR has also recently published an autobiography covering the earlier years of Boris Pasternak, which it had rejected in 1956 (when Simonov was editor). Zaks was a key production man, and the reasons for his dismissal are not clear. Alexander Tvardovsky, the controversial editor of NOVY MIR and a well-known poet, retains his position--at least for the present--and declared on 8 March that his journal would continue to publish critical material. (For other news of NOVY



According to Moscow rumor, the dismissals are an indirect attempt to force Tvardovsky's resignation; a heavy drinker, Tvardovsky has been quite dependent on the aid of Dementiev and Zaks, and may be unable to carry on without them. The open dismissal of Tvardovsky would have aroused protests on the eve of the 4th Writers' Congress, now scheduled after many postponements to start on 22 May. In this connection, one of the black marks against Dementiev was that, in NOVY MIR's November 1966 issue, he had suggested that the Congress (at the time scheduled for mid-December) should pay more attention to literary than to socio-political (i.e., propagandist) themes.

Appropriate assets should speculate as to whether or not the Writers' Congress will finally convene, noting that by the removal of such men as Dementiev, Zaks and (if he resigns) Tvardovsky, Soviet cultural authorities are taking measures to warn liberals not to "cause trouble" at the Congress. Comment might note that such incidents as the Dementiev-Zaks dismissals are only symptoms of the continuing

struggle between liberals and conservatives in the Soviet cultural world; most of this struggle cannot be seen by the outside world.

(See also article in Literary Supplement of LONDON TIMES, 2 March 1967, reprinted in PRESS COMMENT of 9 March 1967, p. 9).

* * *

*CP Popular
Front Strategy
Given New
Encouragement*

French CP
Election Suc-
cesses Attributed
By World Press
To Gaullist Govern-
ment Policies

The French CP, in the view of many foreign correspondents in Paris, owes much of its election success to the fact that the DeGaulle Government had made it respectable in the eyes of the electorate. Out of 486 seats in the new Assembly the French CP now has 72 (compared with 41 in the last Assembly), while the Gaullists and their allies retain only the barest margin of a majority (losing some 40 seats). Government policy has also squeezed out the democratic parties of the center and eradicated the republican traditions represented by the Radicals, at the same time setting the stage for the new Federation of the Left to gain some 30 seats.

The attached collection of quotations from the world press can be cited by selected assets to make the point that the chances of the French CP forming a popular front of the left have been

enhanced, thus promoting the chances for similar developments in other countries. Arguments against this have been outlined in extenso in a number of guidances, most recently in

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Advertisement

* * * * *

After the Revolution, What Happened?

When the revolutionary vanguard had seized power in Russia, and had inaugurated the dictatorship of the proletariat, ... who benefited?

When the Communist Party of the Soviet Union inaugurated the Five Year Plan, ... who got the good jobs?

When reconstruction began after the Great Soviet Patriotic War, ... who got the new apartments first?

While the workers' government sends Soviet butter to Cuba, who gets the jam?

Answer: The "NEW CLASS"

The 50th Anniversary of the October Revolution is not a celebration of fifty years of rule by the Soviet people. Since January 1918, when Lenin disbanded the Constituent Assembly, the Soviet people have had no freely elected representatives, no voice in their own government. The professional revolutionaries who took over the Russian Revolution made themselves the new ruling class, carrying out long since their own Thermidorian Reaction -- ending revolution and replacing it with a self-perpetuating dictatorship representing their own interests.

For a handy guide to this development, order our unclassified booklet, THERMIDOR.

(For those who can obtain their own copies, we still recommend Milovan Djilas' THE NEW CLASS for a full treatment of the new ruling class from inside.)

* * * * *

27 March 1967

1108.

TROUBLES BESETTING DICTATORIAL RULE:

What Happens When the Old Man Goes?

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* * * * *

SITUATION: One of the good fortunes of the United States is that it has a well-established plan for succession if the President dies. Even in the turmoil surrounding President Kennedy's death, there could be no doubt who the new leader was, or of his right to assume his powers. Other democratic and constitutional governments also have written and unwritten rules to follow when government leaders die. Hereditary monarchy has been a time-honored way of establishing a definite succession. The long prevalence of monarchies in history suggests that people found it vital to have succession clearly established, almost regardless of the merits or demerits of the successor.

There were other reasons for hereditary monarchy, however, and they are not irrelevant to modern dictatorships. One was the desire of rulers to have their rule live after them -- to gain a sort of earthly immortality through the succession of "their own flesh and blood." Another reason was that the monarchy came to represent and justify the existence of major political and social hierarchies, such as the court, the nobility, the army and the magistrates. Appointed by the king, the officials served him and his heirs; in return, the monarchy provided them with prestige, a continuing focus of loyalty, and a raison d'etre. When monarchies fell on evil days, however, officials discovered that other reasons for their status had developed and that the old loyalties could be dropped. The oath on the flag to the monarch was always a most solemn occasion in the German army, but when the monarchy became an embarrassment in 1918, a general told the Kaiser: "The oath on the flag is now merely an idea" -- it no longer meant anything.

Today there are few monarchies and even fewer where the monarch holds real power. But dictatorial leaders still hanker for some kind of immortality or survival beyond the tomb: they may like Stalin have cities renamed and monuments built, or they may like Mao try to brainwash a nation (and especially its youth) into parroting their "thoughts." In any case, they are unwilling to surrender power while they still breathe. And officials pay honor to the dictators -- at least as long as the dictators serve their interests. Of course, dictators can use terror to enforce obedience and outward loyalty, as Stalin and Hitler did, but this may fail or rebound, as the July 1944 plot suggests.

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People are apt to suppose that in all dictatorial states, or indeed in all states dominated by one man, the passing of the "Chief" must mean a prolonged period of drift or even anarchy. Perhaps this is sometimes the case. Where a government is custom-tailored to fit one personality and there is little to tie its elements together aside from that personality -- as with Alexander the Great or Napoleon I -- then the removal or demise of the leader is likely to shake the empire to its foundations. More often, however, and especially with Communist regimes and other modern dictatorships, the leader is surrounded by a party apparatus, an officer caste, or other organization, which has from the start had other loyalties besides that to him and which is inclined to look out for its own interests. There may be no effective constitution in our sense, but the organization has rules of a sort. The dictator may have founded the organization and may have appointed its secondary leaders, but his death is unlikely to endanger the system itself -- even when (as after the death of Stalin) there is a period of disorientation and instability. The organization will master its grief without much difficulty and carry on. In fact, if he seems to be acting against their interests, they may speed his departure.

The relation between a dictator and his following is bound to involve tensions. The iron will and self-confidence which got him where he is are usually accompanied by intolerance of dissent and inflexibility in the face of changed conditions. As his followers see it, he becomes more and more divorced from reality; some of them become convinced that they could do the job better. He on his side may fear that he is losing control, that his aides are grooming themselves for his place, and that his own name will someday be vilified or (worse) erased from history. Some of his lieutenants may foster his suspicions in order to eliminate their own rivals; the members of the entourage eye each other with suspicion. Leader and followers, all trained in political maneuver and conspiracy, put their skills to use against each other. A crisis arises "within the family."

The facts on the succession of Communist leaders are not fully known (compared with their deaths, the Kennedy assassination is no mystery at all), but available information shows how the leadership of the apparatus has maintained continuity:

1. Lenin died in January 1924 after a series of incapacitating strokes over a period of almost two years. He was mentally incompetent during parts of this period, but in his lucid intervals he showed concern over Stalin's growing power. Some accounts, never confirmed, suggest that Stalin hastened Lenin's death by poison. Already General Secretary of the Party, Stalin increased his influence through his control of appointments. He pledged fidelity to Lenin's principles at Lenin's funeral, and then proceeded to defeat first Trotsky and then his erstwhile allies against Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, following first a moderate and then a hard policy. By the end of the 1930's he had eliminated (in most cases, by execution) all the other one-time Bolshevik notables, and had as aides men who had risen only through his favor.

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2. Stalin died in March 1953; officially his death was ascribed to a cerebral hemorrhage, but the fact that he had been preparing a purge of his associates has led to suspicions that some of them assassinated him (or perhaps refused him medical aid) to save their own lives. Stalin's lieutenants seem to have feared that public disturbances or even a revolt would follow his death. Malenkov, Stalin's appointed successor, briefly headed both party and state organizations, but had to yield his party position within nine days. Beriya regained control of the secret police, but was executed by the rest of the leadership; according to some reports, he was shot after a struggle at a Kremlin meeting. Khrushchev became First Secretary in five months, forced Malenkov to resign as Premier within two years, and obtained the expulsion from the Presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich in 1957. Reversing Stalin's procedure, Khrushchev had followed first a hard and then a moderate policy. Zhukov, who helped Khrushchev against Malenkov et al., was denounced within four months. Bulganin was obliged to retire in 1958. Except for Mikoyan, the older generation of Soviet leaders had been shorn of power.

3. Khrushchev, on 15 October 1964, "resigned" from office; denunciation of his policies and methods in the official press made it clear that his resignation was involuntary. His son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, was also expelled from his position as editor of IZVESTIYA. Khrushchev's party functions were assumed by Brezhnev and his state functions by Kosygin. Evidently Khrushchev was forced out by a well-organized plot; since A. N. Shelepin and his successor as KGB chief, V. Y. Semichastny, soon obtained promotions, they are believed to have provided secret police support for the action. At this writing, neither Brezhnev, Kosygin nor Shelepin are known to have tried to force out each other.

4. Mao's power position today is still unresolved. It would seem that Mao, the successful revolutionary, could not cope with building and administering a national economy using rational means -- over the question of rational means he lost touch with the officials responsible for carrying out such things. His irrational approach failed in the case of the Great Leap Forward, and left the party cadre to pick up the pieces and work largely for practical goals, including the strengthening their own position. In the fall of 1965, however, spurred apparently by thinly-veiled criticism, by premonitions of death, by some of his entourage, and possibly by natural desires to reuse the tactics learned during the Long March, Mao bestirred himself to "solve" China's problems and launched a series of moves to replace bureaucratic routine with revolutionary enthusiasm, as well as to strengthen his own place in history. The "Cultural Revolution" is in part an effort to assure that Mao will be honored by posterity; it also expresses his commitment to permanent revolution as the way to lift China to modern nationhood. There are already signs that the "Cultural Revolution," like the Great Leap before it, is being quietly curtailed. Mao appears unlikely to

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live much longer, and his efforts to fix the future seem doomed to failure. The day may come soon when an official will tell him: "The thought of Mao is now merely an idea."


The following lessons may be drawn:

1. The succession of Communist dictators tends to bring about a power struggle: 50 years after the Russian revolution, Communist regimes are still without functioning constitutions and stable internal conditions. This struggle may give rise to dubious policy moves, undertaken for the sake of enhancing someone's power or prestige, rather than in the interests of the nation. The struggle begins before the old ruler is gone, as he tries to shore up his position and reputation and to designate an heir, while others try to maneuver to assume the succession. With the old man gone, there has tended to be a weeding out of rivals, with one individual emerging on top.
2. There appears, however, to be an over-all trend toward oligarchy, as opposed to one-man rule. The "collective leadership" of the party apparatus has for the time being proven stronger than any individual in the USSR. Mao seems to have recognized this same trend in China and to have opposed it; however, it seems that he will probably fail if he has not failed already. The trend results from many factors, such as the impracticality of running a country in the twentieth century using permanent revolution or terror tactics, the replacement of bandit-trained personalities by educated administrators of social/industrial/economic programs, the pressure of scientific-advanced weapons competition with the US (and the Soviet Union), and the universal tendency of power groups to become entrenched vested interests.
3. Although certain Communist parties have become secure in their positions, no signs have appeared as yet to indicate that the Soviet (let alone the Chinese) leadership is ready to submit itself to any sort of genuine election or vote of confidence by the Party, much less by the public. Khrushchev once, when faced with the opposition of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, took his case to the Central Committee, but the latter was packed with his supporters, and in any case he had the support of Marshal Zhukov; the incident was without a sequel. Many observers have thought that there might be in Russia an evolution like that in England, in which the rights and powers wrested from King John by the medieval barons eventually became the rights of the public. One may hope that this happens. But an evolution of the Soviet system in this direction would seem to require certain conditions difficult to realize under that system: e.g., public discussion and debate, independence of electors and notables from regime control, and a respect on all sides for the law. Communist leaders do not think in such terms, but in terms of manipulation, maneuver, and conspiracy. Under all conditions, they keep control of the military and police in the hands of their own circle. At present at any rate, a change in leadership involves no chance for the public to express itself, either by voting or revolting.

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
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
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27 March 1967

1109 EUR.

COMMUNIST PARTIES TO DISCUSS
"EUROPEAN SECURITY" IN APRIL

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SITUATION: (UNCLASSIFIED) On 26 February the Soviet news agency TASS announced that a meeting of the Editing Commission which had "prepared material for the conference of European Communist and Workers parties on European security" had ended in Warsaw. The Commission (TASS reported without further details) had "worked in a fraternal atmosphere," had drawn up documents for the consideration of these parties, and had discussed "organizational matters" connected with a conference to be held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, 24-27 April 1967.

TASS had previously reported the opening on 22 February of the Warsaw Editing Commission meeting and had noted it was attended by representatives of the CP's of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Britain, East Germany, West Germany, West Berlin, Greece, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal, the Soviet Union, Finland, France, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. Nothing was said about the absence of the CP's of Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland, Iceland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, or -- of course -- Albania.

On the third day of the deliberations in Warsaw TASS transmitted the highlights of a PRAVDA article (see attachment) which hailed the meeting for its "great importance for the further practical implementation of the Bucharest declaration" -- despite the absence of Rumania at the Warsaw meeting -- which, the CPSU organ claimed, "has already played a positive role in strengthening peace and security in Europe." PRAVDA charged that the efforts of the "fraternal socialist countries" to ease tension in Europe had been hampered by the policy of the United States, in collusion with West German revanchists allegedly seeking "to undermine the united front of the socialist countries in their struggle for security in Europe and to isolate the GDR, to make it more difficult to follow the line adopted by the Warsaw Pact members in the Bucharest declaration."

Evidently the Rumanian recognition of West Germany has caused serious problems for the would-be organizers of "European security". (For more details on the relations between the GDR and the other Pact members see BPG Item #1101 of 27 February 1967, "East Germany Maintains 'Die-hard'

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Opposition to European Mainstream," which focused on their meeting in Warsaw in early February. Although at the time that item was written it appeared that several other East European countries would ignore East Germany's complaints against West Germany, it now seems that Moscow's renewed anti-Bonn campaign is making any understanding with Bonn in Sofia, Budapest, and Prague far less likely -- at least for the time being.)

The 22-26 February Warsaw meeting was held at a time of high-level discussions with East European leaders in Moscow, following a spate of numerous personal contacts by Brezhnev and Kosygin with East European leaders. Hungarian Party Secretary Kadar, Polish Defense Minister Spychalski, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister David, and Bulgarian Party Secretary Zhivkov all visited the Soviet capital, and there were many other visits by high-level CP officials to the East and West European capitals. The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister appeared on Moscow TV on 25 February and included the following statement in his remarks, which are presumably typical of the line to be followed in a "united front" of East and West European CP propaganda:

"The interests of peace and security in Europe demand that the German Federal Republic Government should recognize the real situation in Europe and inviolability of the postwar borders, that West Germany should give up its claims to nuclear weapons and the right of so-called exclusive representation of the entire German people, that it should withdraw the unlawful thesis of West Berlin being a part of the German Federal republic, and that it should recognize the existence of the German Democratic Republic as an independent and sovereign state."

Despite the consistent use of the time-worn phrases "fraternal atmosphere" and "united front" of the CP's in all the reports of East and West European CP discussions and visits early this year, there is considerable evidence that much has still to be agreed on. Rumania and Yugoslavia, which have been very busy in sending delegates to other European countries, were not represented at the 22-26 February meeting in Warsaw and neither is expected at the April meeting in Karlovy Vary; both believe that progress toward European security can only be achieved in concert with all West European governments, including the West German. In this regard, Rumania on 31 January recognized the West German Government, and on 25 February the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG announced that the West German Government was working to improve relations with Yugoslavia.

East Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union have been claiming that the CP's stand united in blaming West Germany as the major cause for tension in Europe. (Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's recent visits to Paris and London have largely failed to gain support for Warsaw's views on the German question.)

On 1 March Poland signed a renewal of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, stressing the threat of West German militarism. Two weeks later Poland and East Germany signed a new 20-year

treaty promising mutual military assistance against any attempt by West Germany to change their borders by force. "Poland will never agree to have a militarist Germany as its western neighbor," CP boss Gomulka stated at the 15 March signing ceremony in Warsaw. East German CP chief Ulbricht accused Bonn of trying to infiltrate the East European Communist bloc and isolate East Germany, and then took off with his delegation to Prague to sign a similar treaty. Poland is reported to be working meanwhile on a new European security proposal (perhaps a spruced-up version of the old Rapacki Plan designed to prevent West Germany from obtaining nuclear weapons) which may be announced before the Karlovy Vary conference. And another platform for a major propaganda move against West Germany before Karlovy Vary opens may be provided by the East German Party congress in mid-April.

All in all, however, it seems highly unlikely that Karlovy Vary will turn out to be the ideal conclave which French CP Politburo Member Raymond Guyot predicted in an article in L'HUMANITE quoted by TASS on 1 March. Guyot said that the April meeting, news of which he claimed had been met with "disappointment amid the Bonn revenge seekers," would advance "constructive ideas on the necessity for replacing the existing military blocs with a system of collective security embracing all states, both capitalist and socialist." In view of the present situation, however, Guyot -- who had traveled to Bucharest and Belgrade on apparently unsuccessful missions before the Warsaw Editing Commission meeting -- was not necessarily on firm ground when he concluded: "The (Karlovy Vary) conference, which will be a reaffirmation of the unity of the European Communist and Workers parties, will be able to urge all peace forces on the continent to act together and to follow the road of security and disarmament." (For a listing of material

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
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According to the 4 March issue of the LONDON ECONOMIST (see attached), the Soviets are not so much interested in the Karlovy Vary conference for what they might be able to accomplish in the way of more unified propaganda on European security but as a "way of reforming the ragged ranks of the Communist movement and getting their friends to accept the policy Russia wants to follow in Asia." The Italians, as the ECONOMIST points out, "seem to have decided to play along with the Russians but without abandoning any of their prejudices against a world meeting." The head of the Italian delegation at the 22-26 February meeting in Warsaw, Hugo Pecchioli, in a statement published in his party's organ L'UNITA on 28 February, admitted that "the Vietnam question was very much present in our discussions." Pecchioli also noted, according to a summary of his statement quoted by the Yugoslav news agency TANYUG, that "not all the parties whose representatives took part in the Warsaw meeting have declared themselves in favor of the European conferences; some of them announced they will go to Karlovy Vary, others reserved the right to announce their decision later." (END UNCLASSIFIED)

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
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1110.

YOUTH IN MOSCOW'S POWER STRUCTURE

The KGB-Komsomol Relationship and Soviet

25X1C10b International Youth Activities



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SITUATION: Available evidence indicates that the Soviet intelligence service plays a leading role in the international youth activities of the USSR. For the past 8½ years the KGB (Committee for State Security) has been headed by men whose known previous experience had been almost entirely in youth work and who had risen to the number one job in the Soviet mass youth organization, the Komsomol (Communist Youth League); these men, the KGB heads Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin (1958-61) and Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny (1961-present), probably still influence some youth activities. Through its affiliation with foreign and international youth groups, the Komsomol plays a leading role in international youth activities, for which it receives strong financial support from the Soviet Government. In those activities Komsomol guidelines and programs conform to Soviet foreign policy and propaganda objectives and also provide opportunities for carrying out intelligence missions.

Background: Basic information on the Komsomol, which prepares and provides the Soviet officials in international youth organizations and congresses, may be summarized as follows. The Komsomol is one of several major instruments used by the state to orient, control, and organize Soviets from early childhood to young adulthood.* The manipulation, ideological indoctrination and organizational training of children and youth is of decisive importance for all Communist Parties -- not only because they need replacements for their depleting, over-aged membership, but (and this is even more important) because only malleable youth can be effectively re-shaped to become "professional revolutionaries," as demanded by Lenin. The Komsomol in 1966 had 23 million members ranging from 16 to 25 years in age. In recent years Soviet youths have been progressively more indifferent to the Komsomol, as revealed by speeches by Soviet leaders. However, now (since the 23rd Party Congress in March-April 1966) that Komsomol membership is required for all young people joining the CPSU, Soviet youth cannot afford to indulge their

*Other instruments are the Octobrist group (15 million children between 8 and 10) and the Pioneers (23 million children between 10 and 15).

feelings of indifference towards the Komsomol if they want to advance in politics, government, management or the professions. The Komsomol has less and less the appearance of being a voluntary organization, and resembles more and more Hitler's and Mussolini's mass youth organizations.

Links between intelligence service and youth organizations: One link between intelligence and youth activities emerges when we trace the careers of top leaders. It frequently happens in Soviet politics that when an official is promoted and is assigned more responsible and broader functions, these include supervision over the field he had previously been in charge of. In any case, when Shelepin rose from the position of First Secretary (chief) of the Komsomol to the chairmanship of the KGB in 1958, he seems to have retained some responsibilities for youth work.* Similarly, when Semichastny, Shelepin's successor as chief of the Komsomol, in turn succeeded Shelepin as chief of the KGB, he is believed also to have continued to oversee youth activities. (It will be interesting to see whether the present First Secretary of the Komsomol, Sergey P. Pavlov, who is regarded as the protege of Semichastny, also becomes chairman of the KGB).** See the attached chart showing the order of succession of Shelepin, Semichastny, and Pavlov.

Another link between the KGB and the Komsomol arises from the KGB's overseas security (and other covert) responsibilities. The KGB is responsible for overseeing all Soviet activities abroad; it has been delegated the specific jobs of clearing all Soviet personnel for trips outside of the USSR and providing all returnees with a standard form on which to report in detail to the KGB on their contacts with foreigners. Thus, the KGB is involved both before and after any trip abroad by a Komsomol official or delegate. Because of its virtual veto powers over foreign travel, the KGB has the opportunity to assess and give an assignment to any Komsomol traveller.

*This is evident from the consequences of Shelepin's visit to the Moldavian Republic for "a few days" in mid-February 1967 to, i.a., hold discussions with the leaders of Party and economic organs. (PRAVDA 19 Feb 67). On 21 Feb 67 SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIA (SOVIET MOLDAVIA) announced that the First Secretary, G. I. Lavranchuk, and two other members of the Central Committee of the Moldavian Komsomol had been replaced. SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIA of 3 March 67 announced the appointment of P. V. Chvertko as Chairman of the Moldavian KGB.

**In this connection, close observers of Soviet politics use the Russian word "shestvo" (derived from the French "chef") which is sometimes rendered as "patronage". What is meant is a leader's practice of training protégés and seeing to their advancement each time the leader himself is elevated.

Further, because top Komsomol officials must necessarily work together with the KGB in working out the lists of selected and approved Komsomol and other travellers, and in other connections. In this, the Komsomol has the function of proposing the make-up of Soviet delegations and teams to countries outside of the USSR; subsequently the KGB goes over these proposals, accepts or rejects the Komsomol's nominees, and sometimes suggests others. Komsomol officials, therefore, are routinely contacted by the KGB in the above-noted connections, and cooperate with the KGB. Although the top age limit (40 years) for Komsomol officials is not rigidly enforced, they must all eventually find a career elsewhere; the KGB thus has excellent opportunities to recruit the most suitable of them for its own purposes.

The frequent travels abroad of Shelepin and Semichastny under Komsomol sponsorship, as well as the work done by these men in the selection and approval of Komsomol travellers* evidently brought them into frequent, close contact with the KGB. Presumably Shelepin and Semichastny, while heading the Komsomol, showed an ability to work effectively with the KGB; otherwise they would hardly have been promoted to the leadership of the KGB.

The Komsomol's role in international youth work: The Komsomol has been the basic Soviet organization concerned with the Communist-front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)** and International Union of Students (IUS)***, and prior to World War Two, with the Communist Youth International, a section of the Comintern. The First Secretary of the Komsomol is traditionally the vice-president of WFDY or of the IUS. Shelepin, while head of the Komsomol, also was vice-president, in turn, of both the IUS and WFDY. There is, interestingly, no indication that Shelepin resigned or was replaced as vice-president of WFDY before the expiration of his second term in 1959; thus, as far as the record goes he was the leading Soviet official in WFDY while also directing intelligence work at the highest level.

The original Komsomol charter was expanded to deal with youth abroad soon after the Bolsheviks seized power. Its first instrument,

*See attached list of trips abroad and special duties of Shelepin, Semichastny, and Pavlov.

**WFDY boasts that it consists of 202 organizations from 99 countries; however, there is no published list of such organizations, and many cannot be accounted for.

***IUS claims 76 students organizations as members.

the Communist Youth International (CYI), was formed in 1919. Three lines of control over the various national youth leagues were established; one of these was from the Russian Communist Party through the Central Committee of the Komsomol and the CYI. The CYI passed out of existence in 1943 and the Anti-Fascist Committee of Soviet Youth (founded in 1941) and WFDY (founded in 1945) came into being. While the names of some of these organizations have changed or disappeared, Komsomol supervision over Soviet international youth activities has continued. (See attachment for additional details).

Guidelines for Soviet international youth work: Complete subordination to Soviet foreign policy and propaganda objectives has consistently characterized the efforts of WFDY and the IUS. In addition, the goals of these organizations include the winning over to Communism of the masses of world youth as well as the future leaders of other countries. (See references). The following excerpts from Soviet press coverage of the February 1967 meeting of the Central Committee of the Komsomol indicate the direction and the authority of the Komsomol's guidance in youth work.

Party Chief L. I. Brezhnev, in his address to the Komsomol leaders, spoke on the tasks of the Komsomol, stressing, i.a.:

- the bonds of the Komsomol and its various contacts with youth and class brother abroad, "a very important sector of [the USSR's] foreign policy work";

- the large number in "fraternal Young Communist Leagues" (70,000,000 in 80 countries) whose international strength is a growing factor (particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America) in the struggle between the forces of national liberation and imperialism;

- the dual goals of undermining capitalism from within and fighting against "oppression and exploitation, against imperialist aggression."

The published resolution of the meeting highlighted Brezhnev's heavy emphasis on the international aspects of the Komsomol's work. It said:


"The Leninist Komsomol is consistently and unswervingly strengthening its friendship and collaboration with the youth of the socialist countries, and with the young fighters in the national-liberation movement developing in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America."


Further details of recent and earlier guidance for the Komsomol in international youth work are included in the attachments.

Scope of Soviet international youth activities: According to the NEW YORK TIMES, (6 March 1967) Soviet Government financing for Communist-front youth organizations has averaged about \$10 million a year since the late 1940's. The range of Soviet international youth activities is demonstrated by statistical reporting: in 1966 alone, according to Brezhnev, Soviet young people played host to more than 200 youth delegations and some 50,000 tourists from 90 countries. Other activities include committee work and correspondence between officials of international youth groups (see above-cited figures), the organization of youth festivals (8 between 1947 and 1962), sporting and cultural events, and propaganda. A Komsomol has abundant domestic propaganda resources, some of which are also used abroad. According to Pavlov as quoted in the Komsomol newspaper of 29 Dec. 1965, the Komsomol "has at its disposal 17 magazines, with a circulation of 5,000,000 copies per issue; 108 central and local newspapers, published in 24 languages and with a circulation of 10,000,000 copies per issue; television, radio and films; that the Komsomol Central Committee's Young Guard Publishing House alone puts out 37,000,000 copies of books annually." From these data, Pavlov concludes: "it becomes evident what a powerful ideological weapon we possess."

Such a weapon, combined with access to the wide range of international activities cited above, provides the Komsomol with abundant opportunities to pursue the objectives outlined by Brezhnev in February. With the helping hand of the KGB, there is probably little to restrict the Komsomol in the pursuit of those objectives.

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27 March 1967

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SUMMIT MEETING IN URUGUAY:

Communist Disorders Likely

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SITUATION: The "Summit Conference" of the presidents of the American republics will be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 12 to 14 April 1967. Past experience and advance information indicate that the Uruguayan Communists will mount a major propaganda campaign to harass and disrupt the conference, using the standard tactics of strikes, street riots, protest marches, printed propaganda, sabotage of public utilities, etc. In fact, a vitriolic campaign in the Uruguayan Communist press began late in February. Their ultimate objectives will be to hinder the conference itself and to create the impression abroad that the great mass of the Uruguayan people abhors and rejects the conference and most of its participants -- especially U.S. President Johnson.

The Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) and its allies in the electoral front known as FIDEL (Frente Izquierda de Liberacion) polled only 6 percent of the total vote in the national elections held on 27 November 1966. (This was twice its showing in the 1962 elections.) While the PCU's electoral strength is weak, and its influence on international questions is slight it has long been increasing its influence among students and organized labor. Indeed, the Communists now have a dominant voice in the major labor confederation, which they are using to good advantage to create an almost constant turmoil of strikes and protests.

The PCU's growth in the recent past can be attributed in large measure to an economic crisis which has been developing for several years in Uruguay. The result has been rampant inflation--435 percent between 1962 and 1966, and possibly 80 percent this year. This has led to an endless round of strikes; an estimated 500 last year, which reached a climax just before the elections.

The PCU -- which closely follows the Soviet line -- also derives part of its strength from close support from the Communist bloc countries. The Soviet embassy in Montevideo numbers some 20 officials (versus 7 Uruguayans in Moscow). In October 1966 four Soviet officials were expelled from Uruguay for "interventing in labor affairs and inciting strikes." Earlier in the year four North Koreans and two East Germans were expelled and two other East Germans were ordered to leave though


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they have managed to stall their departure thus far. A series of strikes from April to December 1965 ended on 14 December 1965 -- after the Uruguayan government had threatened to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

An unclassified attachment to this guidance gives useful facts on the PCU, its influence on labor, students, and the press, and its plans for harassing the Conference.

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NEW YORK TIMES
5 March 1967

Popularity of U.S. Rights Hymn Irks German Reds

Special to The New York Times
BERLIN, March 3—"We Shall Overcome," the song of the American civil rights marchers, has been adopted in the last few months as a kind of spiritual hymn by young East Germans, much to the chagrin of the Communist leadership.

Pete Seeger, the American folksinger, introduced the song at a concert in East Berlin this winter.

Without touching upon reasons for the song's success, the party newspaper Neues Deutschland said today its use "as a sort of hymn" in East Germany was not acceptable.

"It is no longer sufficient," the paper commented, "to say peace is good if we do not say who threatens peace—the United States and West Germany."

New Songs Urged

The party, the Communist youth groups and other organizations, meanwhile, have called for the creation "of fighting songs of our own." New songs, praised by the party paper, bear such titles as "The Song of the Red Flag" and "Youth Greets the S.E.D.," the initials of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party), the name of the Communist party in East Germany.

The attacks on "We Shall Overcome" and other popular American and Western tunes

repression of any attempts by East Germans to find access to Western ideas.

Criticism has been directed by the party and its organizations at painters, musicians, writers, dramatists, theatrical producers and movie makers alike, for their alleged failure to recognize "the Socialist development" of East Germany.

The attacks are in line with East Germany's self-isolation from all things Western and in particular things West German. They have been timed in preparation for the East German party congress the middle of April at which Walter Ulbricht intends to pronounce the "completion of socialism" in his realm.

Neues Deutschland this week chided East Berlin producers for excluding from the stage modern East German plays. Among 46 plays on the repertory of East Berlin's theaters, the paper said, only two represented "modern Socialist German drama." It said that 16 pro-Communist authors had written 10 new plays and begun 14 others but had been unable to find directors to produce their works.

The Communist paper, in the same issue, told painters that "the much-praised term artistic freedom is nothing but naked self-deception." The party organ accused Willibald Sitte, East German painter known in the past for his adherence to come at a time of intensified

the Communist principle of Socialist Realism, of having introduced "surrealist conceptions" in his latest work.

Mr. Sitte and some of his colleagues were told they lacked clarity "in recognizing the role of the German Democratic Republic as the greatest historic achievement in Germany."

"You are not painting to win the acclaim of decadent art representatives in West Germany," the paper warned.

Another target of criticism is Peter Hacks, 38-year old dramatist and Brecht-follower, whose latest play, "Moritz Tassow," was banned in East Germany but had considerable success at its West German premiere in Wuppertal last week.

Mr. Hacks, came from the West to live in East Germany 12 years ago.

Two other East German authors, Manfred Bieler, a novelist, and Wolf Biermann, poet and folksinger, have moved to Prague to escape East German censors.

"Moritz Tassow," a comedy, deals with the failure of an idealistic Communist in setting up a collective farm in East Germany at the end of the war. The play was produced by the Deutsches Theater in East Berlin, but taken out of the repertory after a few weeks—because it did not meet the party's requirement that plays stress Communist success.

Granma, Havana
4 February 1967

Destituyen a tres funcionarios de la empresa ECIL de Camagüey

● CAMAGÜEY.— En el local del Comité Provincial del Partido se efectuó una reunión en la que participaron compañeros de la dirección de la Empresa Consolidada de Industrias Lácteas, MINCIN, OFICODA, y las organizaciones de masa y que fue presidida por el capitán Julián Rizo Alvarez, y Miguel García Calero, primero y segundo secretario del Partido en la provincia, y el teniente Pedro Pupo, delegado provincial del MININT en Camagüey.

En la misma se analizaron las medidas adoptadas por la ECIL en cuanto a la distribución de leche a los consumidores de Camagüey, informándose sobre los antecedentes que dieron lugar a su aplicación.

Se informó que la merma en la producción de leche que se produce en esta época del año, con motivo de la seca, falta de pastos y menor rendimiento de las vacas en ordeño, provocó que ya en diciembre existiera un déficit de 80 mil kilogramos de leche. Entre las medidas que se adoptaron en aquel entonces figuraron la paralización de la producción de queso, yogurt, etcétera.

No obstante en enero 15 ya el déficit ha ascen-

dido a 110 mil kilogramos, lo que hacía necesario la adopción de medidas que garantizaran el suministro de leche a los niños, fundamentalmente a los comprendidos entre las edades de 0 a 6 años.

En el análisis efectuado quedó demostrado que los datos elaborados por la ECIL, en cuanto al censo de consumidores en Camagüey eran inexactos, y que la aplicación burocrática de las medidas adoptadas con base a esos datos dio lugar a irregularidades en la distribución de leche fresca en esta ciudad.

Ante los hechos planteados y la gran irresponsabilidad demostrada por la dirección de la ECIL, se acordó destituir de sus cargos a los siguientes funcionarios de esta empresa a nivel provincial: Joaquín Aguilar, director; Fidel Monteagudo, subdirector; y José Aranda, responsable de distribución.

Finalmente se conoció que se adoptarán medidas encaminadas a superar las deficiencias de los datos del censo de consumidores de la ECIL a fin de evitar la repetición de estos hechos que causan molestias innecesarias al pueblo.

Granma, Havana
21 February 1967

Ustedes hoy fueron obsequiados, por los compañeros del Ministerio de la Industria Alimenticia, con algunos productos, algunas tartaletas de fresa, con fresa de Banao, pasteles de un nuevo tipo que están elaborando, helados Coppelia de 7 sabores (APLAUSOS). Y yo les puedo asegurar que ese helado puede competir con los mejores helados que se puedan producir en cualquier parte del mundo (APLAUSOS). Hoy los producen de 26 sabores. Y es interesante resaltar que desde que comenzó a funcionar esta fábrica ni una sola vez ha faltado uno de los sabores. (DEL PUBLICO LE DICEN ALGO.)

Eso depende de los gustos. Pero, sin dudas, el de chocolate es uno de los que tienen más partidarios. Ni un solo día ha faltado ninguno de los sabores ni se podrá permitir jamás que descienda un ápice la calidad.

¿Por qué no podemos producirlos de mejor calidad que los capitalistas? (APLAUSOS) ¿Qué razones puede tener un capitalista para producir artículos de mejor calidad que la economía socialista? El capitalista produce para las ganancias. En muchas ocasiones lanzan al mercado un producto de extraordinaria calidad y cuando ese producto gana fama, gana prestigio, gana mercado, comienza a disminuir la calidad. En el criterio del capitalista es lógico que influya la competencia. Muchas veces se ponen de acuerdo entre sí los productores capitalistas para hacer una calidad standard, se preocupan fundamentalmente de las ganancias en cada producto.

La economía socialista produce para el pueblo, produce para el consumo, produce para las necesidades. Cuando frente a cualquier empresa de producción socialis-

ta haya alguien que no tenga en cuenta eso, se le podrá llamar de cualquier forma menos socialista. Quien no se preocupa de los productos que elabora para la economía del país y para el pueblo, no es digno de dirigir ninguna unidad de producción socialista (APLAUSOS). Es una falta de consideración y de respeto al pueblo, y no se debe lanzar nunca un producto al mercado cuya calidad no pueda mantenerse en circunstancias digamos normales.

Y eso se empieza a demostrar en una serie de productos. Porque existió la voluntad de que se hiciera así, porque se creó la conciencia de que debía ser así. Y no solamente se mantendrá el número de sabores sino que se incrementará el número de sabores, y llegaremos a 40 ó 42 sabores en ese helado (APLAUSOS). De la misma manera debemos proceder en toda la industria alimenticia, donde tenemos una gran posibilidad de una gran variedad de productos para el consumo, productos de dulcería y de pastelería, caramelos, confituras. Tiene que llegar el día en que nosotros produzcamos todos esos artículos de la misma calidad que se pueda producir en aquellos países más avanzados en esos productos.

De la misma manera en la industria láctea produciremos decenas de variedades de queso. Y en este momento tenemos en Europa cerca de 30 compañeros, en distintos países de Europa, estudiando la técnica de la elaboración de los quesos. Y vamos a producir de todas las variedades más famosas de queso que se producen modernamente, en condiciones preparadas de humedad, de frío, con los cultivos de las bacterias correspondientes a cada uno de los fermentos de donde salen esos distintos tipos de queso.

CPYRGHT

Granma, Havana
17 February 1967

Tomó posesión el capitán Carlos Chaín como viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores

● En horas de la mañana de ayer, tomó posesión como viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores, el capitán Carlos Chaín Saler, quien será presentado esta tarde al Cuerpo Diplomático acreditado en nuestro país.

El compañero Chaín prestó juramento de su nuevo cargo ante el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, doctor Raúl Roa García, en acto celebrado en la Cancillería, al que asistieron funcionarios del MINREX.

● Datos biográficos

Durante los sucesos del 30 de noviembre de 1956, en Santiago de Cuba, el compañero Chaín fue detenido por la tiranía.

El nuevo viceministro de Relaciones Exteriores, fue Coordinador Provincial del Movimiento 26 de Julio en Camagüey durante la clandestinidad. Más tarde se trasladó a la Sierra Maestra, donde obtuvo el grado de capitán. Con posterioridad fue Coordinador del M-26-7 en Oriente.

Al triunfo de la Revolución ocupó los cargos de Comisionado Provincial de Oriente, jefe de una zona de desarrollo agrario en Baracoa y Delegado Alterno de Cuba ante la OEA.

En fecha más reciente desempeñó un alto cargo en el Ministerio del Interior.

March 1967

WORLD PRESS COMMENT ON FRENCH CP ELECTION SUCCESSES

"The non-Communist left is no longer afraid to vote for the Communists, an observer said today. The center, which split on the second round of the presidential elections of 1965 (60 percent for de Gaulle and 40 percent for the left) divided in exactly the opposite ratio this time. Centrist leader Sen. Lecanuet charged today that it was Gaullist tactics which had caused the Communist gains." WASHINGTON POST 14 March 1967.

"De Gaulle has largely himself to blame for the Communist resurgence: his fervent courting of Communist countries and his criticism of U.S. policies have given a new respectability to France's Communists." TIME Magazine 17 March 1967.

"Time was when President de Gaulle stood for stability in France. But his efforts to court Moscow have given a measure of respectability to the Communists in France, so that Mr. Mitterand's appeal to the electorate for a government in which Communists have a say is by no means a wild gamble." HINDUSTAN TIMES (New Delhi) 9 March 1967.

"For the remarkable effectiveness of the pact between the Federation and the Communist Party, General de Gaulle himself must surely claim a share of the credit. Throughout the campaign the desire of the Communists for acceptance and respectability had been striking... If the electorate no longer visualizes M. Waldeck Rochet with a blood-smeared blade between his teeth (to quote the enchanting image of M. Beuve-Mery, editor of LE MONDE) has not General de Gaulle done much to reassure them? He has traveled through Russia with open arms; he has put down the red carpet for Mr. Kosygin; he has welcomed trade agreements and shared cultures; he stresses continually the need for an opening to the East. It is impossible to equate all this with the idea of the Communists as a race of ogres." MANCHESTER GUARDIAN 14 March 1967.

"Independent observers pointed out that President de Gaulle himself had contributed to making the Communists 'respectable' in the eyes of the voters. He did so, they said, by making French-Soviet friendship one of the main elements of his foreign policy, by going to the Soviet Union last summer and, more recently, by giving the Soviet Premier, Aleksei Kosygin, a triumphal welcome in France." N.Y. TIMES, 13 March 1967.

"President Charles de Gaulle, who is not a candidate (his seven-year term does not expire until 1972), has identified the principal issue in today's balloting as 'the republic and liberty,' which he maintains

are threatened because of the nature of 'the main opposition and its dominant element,' a direct slap at the French Communists. This is something of a paradox, since the prime plank of Gaullist foreign policy continues to be accommodation with the nations of the Communist east, ranging from Hungary to North Vietnam." WASHINGTON STAR, 12 March 1967.

"There are those who feel that by deliberately conducting the internal political struggle in such a way that the non-Gaullist center was crushed and the Left emerged as the only alternative to Gaullism, the President has created an explosive situation which may one day haunt his heirs." N.Y. TIMES, 12 March 1967.

"President de Gaulle himself has done more than any other Frenchman to make communism acceptable. He has cooperated in foreign affairs with Moscow, often against his Western allies. He has projected a reunified Europe on the basis of French-Soviet collaboration. In the election, to be sure, he raised the 'Red scare' to try to win votes in the second round. It did not work. The elections turned out much more to Moscow's liking than to General de Gaulle's. It suited the Kremlin that Gaullists should stay in power with their policies for reducing American influence in Europe. But it suited Soviet leaders just as well that Gaullist power should be whittled down in France while Communist Party strength increased more than any other single group." CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Boston) 15 March 1967.

"The remarkable success of the Communists and their steady cooperation with the Socialists is a double blow. There will be increasing pressure from the left that now looks like a possible future government. This has been brought about by a serious miscalculation by the President, who thought his friendship with Russia and hostility to America would win him much of the Communist vote. On the contrary, making the Communist Party respectable has given it a boost and a future." LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH (as quoted by the BBC) 14 March 1967.

"In many cases, the extreme right, which kept repeating 'De Gaulle equals Communism,' gave powerful support to the partisans of Waldeck Rochet. Eliminating the myth of the Communist Party, the personal work of the Head of State, reacted against him... At the moment, opinion across the Channel contents itself with observing that the electorate was unimpressed by the last-minute efforts of the Elysee to persuade it that an advance by the Communists, or a possible success of the opposition parties, would result in the certainty of chaos for France. In this connection, one notes particularly that the part that General de Gaulle himself played by undertaking a major improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, detracted considerably from his argument." LE FIGARO (Paris) 14 March 1967.

(Cont.)

"The Communist Party has gained votes, it has gained seats; it is plainly making headway. One should not be astonished. The visit of the General to Moscow, the 101-gun salute to Kosygin have liberated more than one elector from the scruples which would have prevented him from supporting a party more or less dependent upon a foreign power, and which the General himself described as 'separatist' not long ago." (Editorial by Andre Francois-Poncet of the French Academy) LE FIGARO (Paris) 15 March 1967.

"Certainly, over a period of several years the Communist Party has made desperate efforts to come out of its ghetto. Its attitude at the time of the presidential election gave the first evidence of this, But this was not sufficient. The evolution of the international situation toward detente, the recent Sino-Soviet conflict in which the USSR seemed to put on again the boots of social democracy, and above all the Franco-Soviet rapprochement, all this necessarily made an impression on the average voter of the non-Communist left. In effect, one cannot take every opportunity to extol Franco-Soviet amity, as the President of the Republic does, and at the same time continue to denounce, as the Premier does, the 'red dictatorship' rampant in the Soviet Union, a dictatorship of which the French Communist Party is supposed to be the recognized representative in our country." AUX ECOUTES (Paris) 16 March 1967.

"There is no one outside of the Communist Party ranks who thinks that the success is attributed to sudden confidence in the Communist Party, although de Gaulle's new East policy may have made the Party somewhat acceptable to a number of voters." ATFENPOSTEN (Oslo) 14 March 1967.

"The Gaullist setback in the Sunday run-offs resulted primarily from the agreement between the Reds and two socialist parties to run a single slate of candidates. De Gaulle reportedly had welcomed this polarization of French politics on the theory that the French voter's long standing fear of the Communists would give the Gaullist candidates an advantage. As he told a cabinet meeting last week, the issue is between the Republic and freedom. Obviously, the general miscalculated. The elections demonstrated that the big Communist Party has become more respectable, due mostly to De Gaulle's own open courtship of the Soviet Union. A recent poll showed that most Frenchmen now view the possibility of Red participation in the government without alarm. If the coalition of the left comes unglued, then the Gaullist forces presumably will be able to continue their control of France even after De Gaulle departs from the scene. But if the marriage sticks, then the unholy alliance of Communists and socialists may well be the dominating force in post-de Gaulle France. That is an unsettling prospect not only for sensible Frenchmen, but for Americans who recognize France's key role in Europe." LOS ANGELES TIMES 15 March 1967.

"One could hear on television last Monday evening a well-known Dutch journalist, Mr. Hiltermann, who had made a special trip to Paris, comment on the results of the French election. The Communists are no longer in quarantine, he said, and their notable advance is due not only to the discipline of the parties of the left, but also to the encouragement which some individuals have been able to find in different aspects of the policy of General de Gaulle with his overtures to the East, his trip to Moscow, the withdrawal of France from NATO, his anti-American attitudes." (from an article by the special correspondent in The Hague, Jean Felix-Faure) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March 1967.

"Analyzing the loss by the Fifth Republic, the liberal German-language newspaper BASLER NACHRICHTEN opined that General de Gaulle had only reaped the fruits of his foreign policy: 'One who makes himself the propagandist of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, who allows himself to be acclaimed in the Soviet Union..., who boasts to other Western countries of his excellent relations with the Eastern bloc, should not be astonished when the fear of communism no longer plays its former scarecrow role in his own country.'" (from an article by the special correspondent in Bern) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March 1967.

"Paradoxically, by his overtures toward the East and his close relationship with the USSR, de Gaulle has made Communism respectable in the eyes of his fellow citizens, wrote in effect N.T. and BERLINGSKE AFTENAVIS. Thus it was useless to give warnings at the last minute against a red peril in which the great mass had ceased to believe because of him." (from a report by Camille Olsen, special correspondent in Copenhagen) LE MONDE (Paris) 16 March 1967.

"It is this feeling which caused individuals, organizations and parties to seek the essential unity of action, which, moreover, Gaullism imposed upon them. In this sense, de Gaulle rendered service. He acted in such a way that no one could take exception to his decisions on foreign policy without placing himself 'to the right of Gaullism'. He violated French conservatism by tearing away its colonialist tendencies and its visceral anticommunism. Without the beneficent conjunction of the Gaullist attitude and the feeling of unity of the left, there would have been no leap forward. It is not in the least embarrassing to admit it." (from an article by Jean Daniel) LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (Paris liberal leftist weekly) 15-21 March 1967.

"It turned out, despite all the prophesies and anti-Communist propaganda, that the followers of the leftist parties, almost everywhere, voted in a disciplined manner for the unity candidate, even if this candidate was a Communist... With the exception of a few rightist candidates the foreign policy of the President was not attacked very much in the election campaign.... The left, primarily the Communists, also supports the most positive elements of this foreign policy. The social policy, the economic situation of the country, primarily the development of the living and working circumstances of the workers and other little people counted for much more... As a result of the constitution the government is threatened for the time being (as long as General De Gaulle is president) by a few unpleasantnesses at most...." MAGYARORSZAG (Budapest)

EAST-WEST EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

March 1967

Moscow TASS International Service in English 0553 GMT 24 February 1967

(Text) Moscow--"The meeting in the Polish capital is of great importance for the further practical implementation of the Bucharest declaration, which has already played a positive role in strengthening peace and security in Europe," B. Pyadyshev and R. Sergeyev write in today's PRAVDA.

In their article they discuss European security problems in the light of the recent Warsaw meeting of foreign ministers of Warsaw Pact states. They recall that trends toward easing tension, removing cold war consequences, clearing obstacles hampering normal development of European cooperation, and settling disputes through improved mutual understanding have grown stronger in Europe in the seven months that have passed since adoption of the Bucharest declaration. This is due, above all, to the vigorous and persistent effort of fraternal socialist countries, the article says.

There is also another aspect to the European situation. "Opposing these trends toward easing tensions are the forces of aggression and reaction which seek to work up tension and vitiate relations between European states. A direct threat to European peace comes from U.S. policy, which in another region of the world, southeast Asia, has already led to unleashing a war of aggression against the Vietnamese people.

American policy is all the more dangerous to the European peoples, since it relies ever more heavily on a collusion with the militarist and revanchist forces of the German Federal Republic."

After noting that Kiesinger's government has left the Adenauer-Erhard policy basically unchanged, the writers of the article say that present Bonn rulers have somewhat modified their tactics in pursuing this policy.

"Now," the article says, "the Federal Government no longer dares to openly oppose the line toward detente in Europe. Bonn now tries to camouflage the old dangerous policy with haranguing about a readiness for 'settled existence, the desire to discuss, and peace in Europe.' The Kiesinger government has considerably enlivened the so-called 'Eastern policy,' the main aim of which is to undermine the united front of the socialist countries in their struggle for security in Europe and to isolate the GDR, to make it more difficult to follow the line adopted by the Warsaw Pact members in the Bucharest declaration."

"German Federal Republic ruling circles pin special hopes," the article says, "on the Kiesinger government's declared wish to establish diplomatic relations with the European socialist countries with which the Federal Republic does not have such relations. Bonn leaders are quite eloquent in their efforts to convince public opinion that the establishment of diplomatic relations in itself means a relaxation of tension, and attests to a change in the foreign policy line of the German Federal Republic."

But these policy maneuvers "in the eastern direction" are needed by Federal Republic ruling circles not for relieving tension and developing relations, but as a screen to cover up their revanchist and militarist course, the article

"European countries seeking stronger European security can only welcome a reasonable, critical approach by Federal Republic leaders to problems which caused the political crisis and the change of government in Bonn. This approach of course must be based on an understanding and recognition of the key conditions necessary for European security, which cannot contradict the correctly integrated interests of the Federal Republic."

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 February 1967

Conference Is Planned by European Communists

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 26--The leaders of most European Communist parties plan to meet in Czechoslovakia April 24 to 27 in what the Soviet Union hopes will be the first step toward a world conference of Communist parties.

The meeting is scheduled to take place in Karlovy Vary, once the favorite watering place of the Habsburg Empire's royalty and their friends. The once-plush hotels, dating from the days when the spa was better known as Karlsbad, are to provide the setting.

The conference was announced here tonight by Tass, the Soviet press agency, at the conclusion of a preparatory meeting in Warsaw. The first session, which opened Wednesday, drafted documents for submission to the April conference and discussed its organization, Tass said.

Fraternal Atmosphere

The Warsaw meeting was held in a fraternal atmosphere, the Soviet agency declared. This can be explained in large measure by the fact that most of the parties that oppose a world conference did not attend.

Among the absentees were the ruling Communist parties of Yugoslavia and Rumania.

Moscow Hopes April Meeting at Czechoslovak Spa Will Lead to World Parley

Western European parties that did not attend were those of the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Iceland.

Most of them are believed by Communist sources to be prepared to extend their boycott to the Karlovy Vary meeting, which is to be attended by the parties' top leaders. Efforts to persuade them to change their minds are expected to continue.

In these efforts, the pro-Moscow parties appear certain to make use of a significant change of tack by the leader of the Italian Communists, the most important Western European party member who has hitherto opposed the calling of a world conference.

Usefulness Doubted

In a speech Friday to the plenary session of his party's central committee, Luigi Longo, the Italian General Secretary, emphasized that he had never opposed the principle of a world conference, Tass reported. The Italian party had doubts only about the timeliness and usefulness of such a meeting, Mr. Longo was reported to have said.

Until recently, the Italian party leadership had consistently maintained that a conference called to condemn the Chinese "heresy" would serve only to deepen the split among Communists, not to restore unity. It had bluntly expressed that view when the Soviet Union revived its call for a world conference at the Bulgarian party congress in November.

But in his speech Friday, Mr. Longo declared that the leader of the Chinese party had "destroyed any possibility of relations with Communist parties that do not agree with their position and that denounce and reject their disorganizations and disruptive activities."

Preliminary Talks Urged

The Italian Communist leader stressed that preliminary discussions are needed before a world meeting can be called. At least a year is needed for such discussions, he said.

Because of the leading role the Italian party has taken in the ideological dispute in the Communist movement and the respect in which it is held by significant elements in all Communist parties, Mr. Longo's new statement is viewed as an important concession toward the Soviet Union's desire to hold a world meeting.

To persuade the Italians to attend the Warsaw meetings, assurances had to be given that the parley would adhere to its announced program of discussing "European security" and that the issue of world Communist unity would not be raised.

While the Karlovy Vary meeting again has only Europe on its agenda, the Soviet Union and its supporters are expected to try to turn it into the regional forerunner of a world conference.

THE ECONOMIST MARCH 4, 1967

*East Europe***Getting in by the back door**

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You must hand it to the Russians ; they never give up easily. Representatives of 19 European communist parties met in Warsaw from February 22nd to 26th with the proclaimed object of preparing the ground for a conference on European security problems. There is no reason to doubt that that was what they in fact did ; the conference was fixed for April 24th to 27th at Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia. But, in spite of all the denials, it is widely suspected that for the Russians the real significance of next month's conference is that it will—they hope—be a milestone on the road to a world communist conference, not just a European one. It seems that the Russians refuse to give up this goal, however devious the route to it, because they cannot think of any better way of re-forming the ragged ranks of the communist movement and getting their friends to accept the policy Russia wants to follow in Asia.

The most notable absentees at last week's Warsaw meeting (apart from the Yugoslavs) were the Rumanians. Two years ago they refused to attend a meeting of communist parties in Moscow ; but that meeting was specifically concerned with the Sino-Soviet quarrel, into which the Rumanians have always refused to be drawn. The Warsaw meeting, however, was called to discuss European security—that is, the German problem—and the Rumanians should not have objected to that. Probably, even more than most people, they suspect the motives behind the proposed European communist meeting, and prudently refused to embark on something that might end by making them appear a good deal closer to Moscow than they have any intention of getting.

Other parties, notably the Italian one, seem to have decided to play along with the Russians but without abandoning any of their prejudices against a world meeting. The top Italian communists stayed away from Warsaw last week ; instead they held a central committee meeting at which all their cautious reservations about a world meeting were fully ventilated. Signor Longo, the party secretary, told his col-

leagues that it would take at least twelve months to prepare adequately for a conference. He added that his party would not let itself get dragged into any old conference ; it would go to one only with a previously agreed agenda that really would promote the unity of the communist movement. Altogether, it looks as if the Russians will have to take care lest their ploy for reuniting the movement does not end by merely underlining its differences.

On the other hand the German problem—the ostensible reason for next month's meeting at Karlovy Vary—now seems to be much less of an apple of discord among the east European countries than it was a few weeks ago. Although the Rumanians remain the odd men out, the rest have been carefully letting Herr Ulbricht know they still love him. In Czechoslovakia and in Poland some prominent men have been making speeches in which they took a very tough line towards west Germany.

On Wednesday in Warsaw Mr Novotny signed a new treaty of friendship with the Poles to replace the 20-year treaty signed in 1947 ; the occasion was of course used to reaffirm the solidarity of the Warsaw Pact states against the “pretensions and tactical manoeuvres of Bonn.” But perhaps more significant than all the anti-Bonn diatribes is the report that later this month Herr Ulbricht is to go to Warsaw and Prague to sign treaties of friendship with the Poles and the Czechs. It looks as if the word has gone round that even if most of the east Europeans decide to recognise west Germany, Herr Ulbricht must not be allowed to feel totally abandoned.

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BALTIMORE SUN
7 March 1967

ROMANIA TO SHUN EAST-BLOC TALKS

Says April Parley Agenda
Threatens Party Unity

By STUART S. SMITH
(Bonn Bureau of The Sun)

Bonn, March 6 — Romanian Communist leaders will boycott the party conference to be held from April 24 to April 27 in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, Romanian sources said today.

The meeting, it was explained, is being planned around an agenda which the Romanian party opposes as a threat to party unity.

The conference was called dur-

ing a gathering of nineteen Eastern and Western European Communist officials held in Warsaw between February 22 and February 26. A communique issued the last day announced that the April conference would deal with the "question of European security."

A Common Policy

Political observers here assume that this can be interpreted as an attempt to establish a common policy toward West Germany.

Romania boycotted the February talks, too, as did the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, Albania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Iceland.

In this connection Romanian sources called attention to a recent editorial in *Scinteia*, the Romanian party newspaper, which made pointed remarks

about pressure and uncalled, for interference with other parties' affairs.

The editorial, titled "The unity of the Communist movement is our supreme duty," warned, in effect, that the Romanian party would not feel bound by the April conference's decisions.

"Neither bilateral nor multi-lateral consultations of Communist parties are entitled to discuss internal and foreign policies of other parties. Even less are they entitled to pass judgment on their activity or to set up rules and recipes on what is right and what is wrong in all circumstances and for all countries."

The comment would appear to be a rejection of the criticism directed at Romania for establishing diplomatic relations with Bonn last month.

LOS ANGELES TIMES CPYRIGHT
Sunday 12 March 1967

Romania to Boycott Red Gathering

Says Meeting
Would Deepen
Communism Split

BY LOUIS B. FLEMING
Times Staff Writer

UNITED NATIONS — Romania has made clear its intention to boycott the European Communist meeting next month in Czechoslovakia.

An editorial in the Romanian Communist Party newspaper *Scinteia*, which means "Spark," suggests that such a meeting would deepen the existing division in world communism.

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400060007-6
editorial did not come as a

surprise to diplomats but the sharpness of the thinly veiled criticism of the Soviet Union was interpreted by some as more intense than usual.

Absent at Session

The meeting of European Communist Party leaders is scheduled to begin April 24 in Karlovy Vary, a Czech resort. The meeting was arranged at a planning session in Warsaw last month but the parties of Romania and Yugoslavia, as well as those of the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Iceland did not attend the planning sessions.

There had been indications that the Soviet Union hopes that the meeting of European parties will lead to a world Communist conference. The idea of a world conference was raised again last November at the Bulgarian party congress, presumably at the behest of Moscow, and was subsequently promoted at the Hungarian party congress. Opposition Bases
Romania's opposition

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appears to have two bases:

—A suspicion that Moscow is seeking the conference as a platform to denounce the Communist leadership of mainland China.

—A feeling that Moscow will also use the conference to seek to assert its leadership of world communism.

There is an additional anxiety now on the part of Romania, a fear that Moscow, with the support of Poland and East Germany, will use the European conference to embarrass the diplomatic relations established between Romania and West Germany at the end of January.

New Manifesto

The new Romanian criticism of the conference idea and of Soviet policies in the world Communist movement appears to represent a new manifesto of the kind of nationally oriented communism espoused both in Buch-

The lengthy article occupied most of the space in *Scinteia* on Feb. 28, but

the usual foreign translations apparently were deliberately delayed to avoid the impression that Romania was opening a propaganda campaign against Moscow. The English translation has just been made available here through Agerpress, the official Romanian news agency.

Seen as Attack

Within the article, there is no reference to the conference proposal as such, nor is any of the criticism of the Soviet Union directed by name at Moscow. But experts in such matters report that there is no question about the object of the article, and Eastern European diplomats here have corroborated the interpretation.

The article goes beyond

the usual Romanian insistence on equality and independence for all Communist parties. It adds a demand that the Soviet Union, and others, cease immediately meddling in the new problem of Communist parties that have been split into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions.

"Any tendency of imprinting from the outside

a certain orientation or a certain mode of solving these problems to a party means inadmissible interference in its internal affairs," Scinteia asserts.

The opposition to the proposed conference appears to be summed in this statement:

"It is the firm belief of the Romanian Communist Party, a belief stemming from the most profound requirements of the development of the Communist movement, that in the conditions of today, nothing, absolutely nothing, must be undertaken that might aggravate the divergencies, worsen the present state of affairs, might add new elements of tension and deepen the danger of diversion."

In discussion of inter-party relations, the Romanian party argues that socialist internationalism "should proceed from the observance of the right of each party to independently establish its political line and objectives."

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THE GUARDIAN Friday March 3 1967

Herr Ulbricht urges harsh terms in answer to Bonn

From NORMAN CROSSLAND

Bonn, March 2

West Germany's policy towards Eastern Europe, which scored a notable success when diplomatic relations were established with Rumania last month, is encountering stiffening resistance in other Warsaw Pact States whose support against Bonn is being energetically rallied by the East German Communist leader, Herr Ulbricht.

The renewal of the friendship treaty between Poland and Czechoslovakia in Warsaw yesterday provided a further opportunity for attacks against West German policy in Eastern Europe, and the words of the Czech leader, Mr Novotny, were another blow to Bonn's hopes that Czechoslovakia might be prepared to follow Rumania's example.

Although Mr Novotny was more restrained than the Polish Communist Party leader, Mr Gomulka, in his comments about West Germany, he also rejected Bonn's claim to represent all Germans and said that the new German Government must recognise the Oder-Neisse line and accept the existence of two German States.

He did not, however, make the fulfilment of these demands a condition of Czechoslovak agreement to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany, as the Poles have done. Herr Ulbricht's aim is to obtain from his allies a hard and fast undertaking that normalisation of relations with West Germany is only possible if Bonn accepts the facts of life and, in addition, renounces for ever any kind of nuclear rôle.

Communist disharmony But far from showing solidarity among the Warsaw Pact countries, the response to Bonn's

initiative served to lay bare the disharmony in the Communist camp. The hurriedly called Foreign Ministers' conference in Warsaw after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Bucharest did not produce the results which Herr Ulbricht desired, although now there are signs that his campaign may not be altogether unsuccessful.

Like disturbed ants, Communist statesmen have been rushing hither and thither to regroup their forces, and the East Germans are banking on the conference of European Communist parties in Karlsbad in April to decide on a common approach.

The West German Government had every reason to believe that Hungary would follow Rumania in agreeing to full diplomatic relations, but recent press comments in Budapest have not been encouraging and the Hungarian party leader, Mr Kadar, has not been in Moscow this week for the benefit of his health.

Hard tier

The Bulgarian Foreign Minister accepted an invitation to call at East Berlin on his way to Scandinavia, and it can be assumed that Herr Ulbricht has been cautioning his guest against falling for Dr Kiesinger's charms.

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What Bonn referred to as the "hard tier" of the Warsaw Pact—East Germany, the Soviet Union, and Poland—could have been expected anyway to react as they have to the establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Rumania; but the outcry in West Germany against the nonproliferation treaty is providing them with further propaganda to use in persuading their "softer" partners to ignore Bonn's offers. This is just what the moderate members of the West German Government had feared would happen.

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BALTIMORE SUN
17 March 1967

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U.S. EXCLUSION FROM EUROPE TALKS DENIED

East Germany Asserts
Bonn Is Preventing
Security Parley

By STUART S. SMITH

(Bonn Bureau of The Sun)

Bonn, March 16 — East Germany today denied that the Warsaw Pact nations are trying to arrange a European security conference without United States participation.

Some observers interpreted the action as a possible first step in breathing new life into the long-dormant proposal to hold high-level talks about the continent's political future.

Without United States representation, neither Washington nor any other Atlantic alliance capital with the possible exception of Paris would be willing to meet with Europe's Communist leaders to discuss the matter.

Magazine Criticized Bonn

Heretofore, Warsaw alliance officials have either belittled the United States' right to be present or confused the issue with imprecise remarks.

Today, however, the semi-official East Berlin magazine *German Foreign Policy* appeared with an article which unbraided West Germany for al-

legedly trying to prevent a security conference.

By artificially exaggerating the question of who should and who should not attend, Bonn has blocked such talks, it said, charging that Bonn is creating the impression the Warsaw alliance members would not welcome United States participation, the magazine said.

"Complete Falsification"

There can be no talk of the United States being "ousted" from Europe, the Ulbricht regime periodical asserted.

The "Bonn version," to the contrary, is a "complete falsification of the position of the Socialist states in reference to the question of European security in general and an all-European conference in particular," it added.

Last summer's Warsaw alliance Bucharest conference communique, the magazine pointed out, said: "As to the participants in such a discussion, [European security talks] the Warsaw Treaty states make no exception.

Each Can Choose

"It is of the competence of each country to choose whether to participate or not, to participate in the discussion and the solving of European problems. . . .

"The states represented at the [Bucharest] meeting are convinced that neither are the countries on other continents indifferent to the turn the European problems take. . . .

"Therefore, any government concerned with the destinies of peace cannot but welcome every step that leads to detente and improvement of the situation in

Europe and cannot but back up such efforts."

Last April, following an audience with Pope Paul VI, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, proposed an all-European summit meeting without the United States.

However, at about the same time Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, said the United States would of course be expected to be present.

During Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin's trip to London four weeks ago, he and Prime Minister Harold Wilson agreed a European security conference would be "valuable, subject to the necessary preparations."

The new Kiesinger Administration's flexibility in Eastern European affairs might make a conference more, appealing to the U.S.S.R., but even assuming Moscow and the other Warsaw Pact members strongly desire such talks, which is by no means sure, it seems unlikely they would be launched until West Germany signs the proposed nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW ON BELGRADE
FOR CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CP'S

IL GIORNO, Milan, Italy
8 January 1967

According to information from a good source, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In the letter, it seems, the Soviet leaders asked Tito to modify his attitude with regard to a conference of the European communist parties, which, officially, is to be devoted to European security. Tito had expressed the opinion that this conference should not be held, or that, if it were, the communist parties in power should not participate. It is not difficult to understand the real motives of Tito's reservations. The Yugoslav leaders, while not saying so, indicate that they fear that an intercommunist conference dedicated to European security would, instead, develop into a conference condemning the Chinese.

The Soviet document, furthermore, asked for clarification in terms of reproof, about the Yugoslav proposals for the reorganization of the communist party; proposals aimed at lessening the "hold" of the party on the internal affairs of the country and at creating in Yugoslavia other centers of state power (for example, a parliament independent of the Party). The Soviet letter stated that they spoke in the name of all communist parties in power. But this declaration, it seems, is inexact. The Rumanians, in fact, have already let Belgrade know that they are not in sympathy with the Soviet initiative.

This information came to light a few days prior to the meeting (set for next Tuesday) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and several weeks prior to the trip that Tito intends to make to Moscow. For some time, as is known, Yugoslav-Soviet relations have shown a certain amount of worsening. In September of last year, Brezhnev came to Yugoslavia to propose this very thing, the convocation of an intercommunist conference to condemn China and to ask, it seems, for clarification on the Rankovic affair - the neo-Stalinist leader ousted by the Yugoslav Communist Party for being opposed to the economic reform which the country is carrying out; Rankovic, according to others, was also very much allied with Moscow. Brezhnev on the occasion of this visit got nothing from Tito.

The Yugoslav economic reform and the proposals for democratization of the domestic life of the country (of which confirmation was recently noted with the liberation of Djilas), have caused a certain amount of anxiety in the Soviet leaders. On their side, the Yugoslavs, while showing toward Maoism the same severe judgment as the Soviets, are not in accord with the idea of a conference condemning the Chinese; they fear that the condemnation of Mao will at the same time also serve the Russians

in reestablishing over the European communist countries a policy of strict obedience to the Moscow center. In this double series of fears, of one against the other, lies the primary reason for the letter sent by the Russians to the Yugoslavs.

This letter, furthermore, bears witness to a new state of tension in relations between the two countries, perhaps one of the most serious in years in this respect. This situation will certainly be discussed in the forthcoming plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. The meeting has on its agenda, in fact, "the current problems of the international Communist movement." Then Tito, while in Moscow, will probably seek a direct meeting with Brezhnev. In any case, it is possible that, as of now, a new phase in Yugoslav-Soviet relations has probably been opened - a phase open to any possible development.

In this regard, it should be recalled that recently, and on more than one occasion, the Yugoslav leaders have openly shown their irritation in the face of Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the country. A scarcely veiled specific reference to this problem was made recently by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs Nikezic in the text of an interview over Belgrade television. Nikezic, referring to the "Rankovic affair," stated that "certain dogmatic and bureaucratic forces, not finding support within the country, sought it abroad, thus exposing Yugoslavia to a series of possible pressures." The principal Yugoslav daily, BORBA, has hastened to declare that "Yugoslavia possesses the strongest desire and decision to oppose any sort of pressure whatsoever." It is needless to say that "pressures" of this type are attributed to Moscow. But Belgrade, it seems, has decided to resist. -- Raffaello Uboldi.

March 1967

Basic Guidance for Komsomols in International Youth Activities

(excerpts from: Ralph T. Fisher, "Pattern for Soviet Youth", Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, concerning the report of Komsomol Central Committee member Lazar Shatskin to the Third Komsomol Congress, Moscow, October 2-10, 1920.)

How Komsomolites were expected to think and act in regard to the CIY (Communist International of Youth) was indicated in Lazar Shatskin's report to the Third Komsomol Congress. Shatskin had been one of the Komsomol delegates present at the founding of the CIY, and he had been elected to its Executive Committee. He discussed first the question of the relation of the various Communist Leagues of Youth to their respective Communist Parties, and, correspondingly, of the new CIY to the Comintern. In the beginning, the Western Communists at Berlin all insisted that their Communist youth organizations must have "absolute independence" from any party. Why was this? Shatskin explained it this way: The revolutionary youth of the West had had previous experience with adult "social patriots" who, being afraid of the "revolutionary spirit of youth," had tried to control the youth organizations. Youth had therefore developed a "hatred toward adult organizations in general." Furthermore, during the World War the Communist youth groups in Western Europe "had been obliged against their will to take upon themselves the functions of political parties," inasmuch as the adult parties had forsaken social democracy for "social patriotism" in supporting their governments in the war. But the situation now, declared Shatskin, had changed. Communist Parties had been organized in Western Europe. They "had no need to fear the revolutionary youth organizations," and therefore were not inclined to hamper their development. Moreover, these Communist Parties could now relieve the youth organizations of their "functions as political parties," which the youth groups had "fulfilled involuntarily during the war." Therefore, Shatskin explained, the old slogan of "absolute independence of the youth movement" -- which had been necessary in order to break youth off from the "social patriotic parties" -- was out of date. The type of relationship suited to the present, he went on, was that which obtained in Russia. Here, "we can have full confidence in the Communist Party," which is "model in all respects." Therefore, he said, "we, while recognizing the necessity of youth's spontaneous activity in organizational work, at the same time recognize the necessity for the centralization of all Communist forces, including the League, under the guidance of the Party." The Russian type of relationship between Youth League and Communist Party was characterized as "the most advanced," and the relationships prevailing in all other countries were graded, from the most "backward" (as in Denmark and France) through the "intermediate" or "transitional" stage of greater "trust" and centralization (as in Germany) to the "most advanced" type as in Russia.

That gradation was not merely an acknowledgement of a trend.

Shatskin made it clear that the Komsomol delegates had to "bring the Western European youth organizations over to the platform that we have in Soviet Russia." At the Berlin Congress, Shatskin and his Russian colleague had found all the Western Europeans opposed to the Soviet view. But after the application of what he called "pressure (theoretical)," and "an extremely great struggle," he had managed to persuade the other youth organizations to "relinquish the functions of political parties and accept the program of the Communist Parties of their countries." By the same logic, apparently, the Western delegates were persuaded to make the CIY a part of the Third International. But dissenters remained, and only by continued effort had they been brought around to the Russian view. As of October, 1920, Shatskin exulted, "We may with complete justification announce that on this question the Russian Communist League of Youth... is now the victor in all respects."

Thus, by October, 1920, the reins of authority in the Communist International of Youth were already securely in Bolshevik hands. Obviously facilitating this was the great prestige enjoyed by the one Communist Party that had ridden successfully through a revolution. But the Russian Communists were not relying on that prestige alone. They had obliged those youth groups that wished to call themselves "Communist" to acknowledge the authority both of the Comintern and also of the Communist Parties in their respective countries. Meanwhile, at the Second Congress of the Comintern (July 17 to August 7, 1920), the Bolsheviks had obtained the enactment of regulations which required all Communist Parties to subordinate themselves to the Executive Committee of the Comintern and which, at the same time, guaranteed that the Executive Committee of the Comintern would be controlled by the Russian Communist Party. The result was that the leaders of the Russian Communist Party had created a system of multiple controls leading from the apex of the RCP down to all foreign Communist youth groups. One line of control went through the Comintern to the CP of each country concerned, and thence to the national youth league. A second line went through the Comintern to the CIY, and thence to the various national youth leagues. And still a third line went through the CC of the Komsomol to the CIY, and thence to the other youth leagues.

Not content with annulling the CIY's claim to independence, the Russian Komsomol representatives strove to achieve unity of outlook in the CIY. Some of the foreign youth groups, for example, had been clamoring for universal disarmament. The Soviet position at the moment was that "the slogan of universal disarmament is in fact counter-revolutionary, for it suggests to the workers the thought that they can seize power without using arms." The Russians had succeeded, reported Shatskin, in having the CIY reject pacifism and come out for the Soviet position. In order to insure conformity in the future, the Russian delegates had insisted that the policies to be followed by youth groups in other countries must be determined by "the experience of the Russian youth league, whose basic principles are suited to any youth organization under conditions of proletarian dictatorship." The Russian leaders were alert to safeguard the CIY against the "yellow" (i.e., procapitalist) or "social patriotic" youth groups, the

"socialist center" youth groups, and the "super-Lefts". Very pernicious, said Shatskin, were the "socialist center" people who had tried to join the CIY in order to "demoralize" it by urging "autonomy" for youth groups within the CIY. But the Communists, Shatskin reported with satisfaction, had turned the tables on them and in several cases had managed either to split the rival organizations or to take them over from within.

Acting in response to Shatskin's report, the Third Congress ratified the entry of the Komsomol into the CIY. The delegates promised "spiritual and material help [probably meaning money] to the youth of the countries oppressed by capitalism." They declared their obligation "to serve as a model for the international youth movement and to take the most active part in all the struggle and work of the Communist International of Youth." The delegates also accepted it as their task "to rear the members of the League in the spirit of the international solidarity of the young proletarians of all countries." The new League Program adopted at the Third Congress characterized the CIY as the "military staff directing the struggle of the young workers and peasants of the whole world" and the Komsomol as "the foremost detachment of the international army of proletarian youth." What specific activity this might mean for the rank-and-file Komsomolite was not clear. The Central Committee hailed the establishment of "close ties" with Western youth. But so far, under the conditions of the Civil War, it had not been possible either for many foreign youths to come to Russia or for many Komsomolites to go abroad. It remained to be seen how much contact would prevail later, after the return of relative peace. For the time being the demands upon Komsomolites in regard to world affairs would, for the most part, be restricted to propaganda among Soviet youth. Only a few selected Komsomolites, like Shatskin, could work directly with pro-Communist youths of other countries, persuading or obliging them to follow the Soviet leadership.

March 1967

Selected Trips Abroad of Shelepin, Semichastny and Pavlov

A. Shelepin*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
1946	Attended founding session of IUS in Prague; was elected vice-president of IUS in 1947 and re-elected in 1950 and 1952.
1947	Headed Soviet delegation to First world Festival of Youth and Students in Prague, in August.
1952	Headed Soviet youth delegation to the 4th Congress of the League of Free German Youth.
1953	Attended Third World Youth Congress in Bucharest, in March.
1954	Headed Soviet youth delegation to Communist China.
1959	Member of delegation to Peking for 10th anniversary of establishment of Chinese Communist regime.
1962	Headed CPSU delegation to Hungary.

B. Semichastny

<u>Year</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
1951	Traveled to finland for World Youth Week.
1953	Traveled to Communist China and Vienna on youth matters.
1954	Traveled to Vienna on youth business.
1955	Traveled to France on youth business.
1956	Traveled to Berlin and Yugolslavia on youth business.
1957	Traveled to Peking and Berlin on youth business.
1958	Traveled to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia on youth business.

*As a member of the All-Union Committee for Physical Culture and Sport, Shelepin was in a position to help select and approve Soviet atheletic teams representing the USSR in the Olympic Games and other competitions. In 1945-53.

C. Pavlov

<u>Year</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
1959	Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival in Vienna.
1960	Member of Soviet youth delegation to Guinea.
1961	Headed Komsomol delegation to Cuba.
1962	Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival in Helsinki.
1962	Member Party and Government delegation to Bulgaria.
1963	Headed Komsomol delegation to Congress of East German youth organization.

March 1967

Occupants of Top Jobs in Komsomol and KGB since 1952

<u>Year</u>	<u>First Secretary of Komsomol</u>	<u>Chairman of KGB</u>	<u>Other Assignments</u>
1952	Aleksandr Nikoloyevich Shelepin was promoted from Second to First Secretary in November.		Shelepin became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
1954			Shelepin, while a deputy to the Supreme Soviet, was appointed to the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet of Nationalities.
1958	Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny was promoted from Secretary to First Secretary in April; he had also been a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.	Shelepin appointed Chairman in December.	In April Shelepin became head of Central Committee Party Organs Section for the Union Republics (personnel and organizational work).
1959	Sergey Pavlovich Pavlov was promoted from Second to First Secretary in March.		In March Semichastny succeeded Shelepin in the staff of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In August 1959 Semichastny was transferred to position of Second Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan CP Central Committee.
1961		Semichastny replaced Shelepin in December.	Pavlov became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
1964			Semichastny became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Shelepin became a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (now called "Politburo").

CURRENT DIGEST
of the SOVIET PRESS
22 February 1967

**ON TASKS OF YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE IN PRESENT-
C.P.S.U. CONDITIONS.**—From Report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev,
General Secretary of C.P.S.U. Central Committee, at Plenary
Session of Y.C.L. Central Committee on Feb. 1, 1967. (Pravda,
Feb. 4, pp. 1-2, 2,000 words. Condensed text:) Comrades!
The whole country is now developing the preparations for the
50th anniversary of the October Revolution. The C.P.S.U.
Central Committee has adopted and published the first resolu-
tion on this question.* I must say, comrades, that the Party
attaches exceptional importance to this document. Its theses
must underlie the present activity of all the working people, of
all our public organizations, and of course, not last of all, of
our Leninist Y.C.L. ...

Soviet youth is not a sidelines observer of international life,
it takes a constant and active part in it. The international
bonds of the Y.C.L. and the variegated contacts of our young
men and women with their coevals and class brothers abroad—
these, comrades, are a very important sector of our country's
foreign-policy work as a whole.

It is sufficient to mention the Y.C.L.'s cooperation with fra-
ternal Young Communist Leagues, which now unite more than
70,000,000 young men and women in 80 countries around the
world. Seventy million fearless young hearts aflame with re-
volutionary enthusiasm and dedicated to the cause of commu-
nism are a tremendous international force, comrades! This is
one of the factors that will assure our final victory in the
struggle between the two systems now being waged in the
world. It is also gratifying that the ties between Soviet youth
and the young people of Asia, Africa and Latin America are
growing stronger year by year. This is one of the manifesta-
tions of our party's policy of fraternal alliance with the forces
of national liberation in joint struggle against imperialism and
for peace and the freedom of peoples.

Matters are far from limited to official contacts with youth
organizations. How many interesting, varied forms of inter-
national ties and contact have young people invented! I have
in mind the numerous delegations to various countries of the
world, friendship trains and international youth camps, con-
struction detachments and geological prospecting groups, and
the assistance of teachers and doctors to our friends in the
liberated countries of Asia and Africa.

Obviously, these ties will continue to grow; the number of
Soviet young people who have traveled abroad will increase
each year. The number of our guests is also increasing con-
stantly. Last year alone Soviet young people played host to
more than 200,000 youth delegations and some 50,000 tourists
from 90 countries.

We must think of how to take still better and more active
advantage of these relations for deeper and more convincing
propaganda of our ideas and our way of life. Each Soviet
young man and each Soviet girl must become a worthy ambas-
sador of the Soviet land, a good propagandist of the cause of
communist construction in the U.S.S.R., must help to win new
friends for our country and be at the same time modest and
questing, absorbing everything that helps to improve our
activity.

We must not forget, comrades, that we live in the circum-
stances of a fierce class struggle of two worlds, the world of
socialism and the world of capitalism. In ideology, as in
other spheres of our relations with the capitalist world, so-
cialism is on the historical offensive, capitalism on the de-
fensive. The ideological influence of socialism, the effect of
our Marxist-Leninist ideology and of our successes in build-
ing the new society upon the minds of the broad masses in
capitalist countries, is tremendous. And this influence is
growing day by day, undermining the foundations of capitalism
from within.

However, struggle is struggle—as we know, this is always a
two-way process. The imperialists are not idle, either. They
have at their command a huge and quite sophisticated appara-
tus for propaganda and influencing public opinion. With its
help they are trying to poison the minds of the masses of peo-
ple in their own countries and also to extend their influence to
some part of the population of the socialist countries. They
are feverishly seeking out our weak spots, trying to utilize
even the smallest of them for their propaganda to the detri-
ment of the cause of socialism and communism.

What can one say about these efforts of our class enemies?
History itself has more than once given a convincing answer
to all their attempts at ideological subversion. Today we can
proudly say to you, comrades, that the older generation of
Communists passed through all the difficulties and tests of the
past with honor. Faithfulness to the behests of Lenin, bound-
less devotion to the cause of the working people, helped us in
the complicated years of the first five-year plans, when we
had to blaze the previously untrod paths of socialist construc-
tion, and in the grim times of the war's tests. Marxism-Len-
inism is our lodestar, our compass, by which we have always
checked and continue to check our course.

It is a pleasure to recognize that the Young Communists of
today are carefully guarding the traditions of their fathers,
the revolutionary traditions of our party. We, the older gen-
eration of Communists, want very much to be firmly confident
that those to whom we are passing the baton in the Leninist
relay will carry it honorably across the expanses of our great
motherland, will hold sacred the purity of our banner, the im-
mortal Marxist-Leninist teaching.

For this to be indeed so, the mere wish alone is not enough,
comrades. For this one must work long and hard, tirelessly
training our young people and steeling them ideologically. It
would be an unforgivable mistake not to notice that we have
some young people—no matter how insignificant their number—
who, lacking life experience and sufficient theoretical prepara-
tion, display political shakiness, unconcern and, I would say, a
scornfully thoughtless attitude toward life. We cannot put up
with this. Today we can no longer be satisfied with the fact
that the absolute majority of Soviet young people perform their
civic duty with a high sense of responsibility, thoroughly under-
stand and actively carry out Party policy. Our task is to fight
for every young person, for his convictions and for his active
stand in life. This is, surely, the most honorable and noble
mission of the Leninist Young Communist League—to train
staunch, ideologically convinced, boundlessly devoted fighters
for the great cause of building communism.

What conclusions stem from the above, comrades? What
tasks are particularly important for the Young Communist
League in today's conditions?

The task of the Young Communist League consists above all
in teaching all our young people to master Marxist-Leninist
theory deeply and comprehensively. Without firm knowledge of
the scientific fundamentals of communism, it is practically im-
possible for a young person to understand all the intricacies of
contemporary politics and especially to be an active aide of the
Party in its principled struggle for the purity of the ideas of
communism.

The revolutionary universities for today's young person be-
gin with Marxist literature. A taste for it must be cultivated
in each person, the ability to work seriously with it. Remem-
ber how Vladimir Ilyich Lenin put the question of the political
education of a Communist: "If I know that I know little, I shall
strive to learn more, but if a person says he is a Communist
and says he doesn't need sound knowledge, nothing like a Com-
munist will come of him." Only systematic study, not me-
chanical, but conscious and deep assimilation of Marxist-Lenin-
ist views will help each young person to develop firm inner

convictions. And only then will he easily understand any complicated situation, will he be able to reach a correct appraisal of the events and phenomena of life and chart a correct course.

The task of the Young Communist League is to help the young generation of Soviet people to fulfill Lenin's behest to enrich their memory with knowledge of all the treasures that mankind has built up. The wisdom of this behest of Lenin is perhaps more evident today than ever before. Now that we have undertaken the building of communism, questions of science and culture are acquiring extraordinary, unprecedented importance. The generation of Soviet people coming in place of us should continue and itself create the highest achievements of modern science and culture. This is absolutely necessary, comrades. Without this we shall not be able to build true communism.

The task of the Y.C.L. is, further, to train our young people always in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, of deep and sincere awareness of their filial duty to their people, to their socialist fatherland. The inculcation of civic qualities, the inculcation of patriotism, begins in us at the school bench. It rises to a new and higher level in the atmosphere of common creative work, in the army setting, and in the political life of the Soviet collective. And everywhere the Y.C.L. can exert its beneficial influence.

Comrades, we must raise a new generation of genuine patriots, prepared for feats of labor and arms. The Communist Party, the Soviet government and our people, in fraternal unity with the peoples of the countries of socialism and with the support of all the progressive forces of the world, are doing everything to prevent a new war. But we know the aggressive nature of the imperialists and should be prepared for anything. If the grim hour strikes, Soviet youth should be ready to fulfill its sacred duty—to defend the homeland by arms, to defend the life, honor and freedom of its people. Our Central Committee is confident, comrades, that, if necessary, our young people will fulfill this duty of theirs as befits Soviet people, they will fulfill it no worse than their fathers did in the Great Patriotic War.

The task of the Y.C.L. is constantly to develop class consciousness in young people and to train them in the glorious revolutionary traditions of our party and proletariat. Particularly favorable conditions for such work have taken shape at the present time. The Land of the Soviets is summing up the half-century results of its life and struggle and conducting a general review of all of October's achievements. The living word of the veterans of the Revolution is being heard, funda-

mental research is being conducted and documents are resurrecting more and more new pages of history. An atmosphere of political and creative upsurge reigns in the country. Things should be so arranged that every young person now goes through a real school of revolutionary training.

Finally, the task of the Y.C.L. is to train all our young people consistently in the spirit of proletarian internationalism. While concerning ourselves with the welfare of our people and with the construction of communism in the U.S.S.R., we at the same time regard ourselves as a part of the world socialist system, as one of the detachments of the worldwide army of fighters for the freedom and happiness of peoples, for the victory of socialism and communism throughout the world. This is our fundamental position. It was bequeathed to us by V. I. Lenin. It is necessary to impart to every young man and woman a clear understanding of the huge role played in the destiny of mankind by the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries and Communists of the entire world.

Lately the ruling circles of imperialist countries and their propaganda apparatus have been especially active in trying to weaken and shatter the unity of the socialist countries and to disrupt the friendship and cooperation among the peoples of these countries and their public organizations, including youth organizations. We counteract these efforts by a consistent policy of strengthening the solidarity of our countries and Marxist-Leninist parties and the friendship of peoples. Here too the Y.C.L. can and should be a valuable assistant to the Party, helping to raise our young men and women to be real internationalists, strengthening friendship with the youth of the fraternal countries of socialism, new independent states and the progressive circles of young people in capitalist countries. The young generation of the Land of the Soviets has always been and, we are sure, will always be an example of militant class solidarity with the revolutionary fighters against oppression and exploitation, against imperialist aggression, for the freedom and independence of peoples.

Comrades! The Communist Party and the Soviet state face important and complex tasks. They are of prime significance not only for the destiny of our country. We look ahead with confidence. Before us is a clear and noble goal—to complete the great cause of constructing communism. In the solution of all these vast tasks the Y.C.L. has been—and now should be ever more—a firm support and an active assistant to the Communist Party...

CPYRGHT

CURRENT DIGEST
of the SOVIET PRESS
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COMMUNIQUE ON SECOND PLENARY SESSION OF Y.C.L. CENTRAL COMMITTEE. (Komsomolskaya pravda, Feb. 4, p. 1. Complete text:) Discussion of the report of Comrade S. P. Pavlov, First Secretary of the Y.C.L. Central Committee, "On Further Improvement of the Work of the Y.C.L. in Guiding the All-Union V. I. Lenin Young Pioneers' Organization" continued Feb. 3 at the plenary session of the All-Union Y.C.L. Central Committee. The following spoke in the discussion: Yu. D. Poroikov, First Secretary of the Bashkiria Province Y.C.L. Committee; O. V. Zinchenko, assistant head (for Y.C.L. work) of the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy; N. M. Chernova, editor-in-chief of Pionerskaya pravda; S. Namatbayev, First Secretary of the Kirgizia Y.C.L. Central Committee; U.S.S.R. Honored Master of Sports I. A. Novikov; L. S. Sobolev, Chairman of the Board of the Russian Republic Writers' Union; Hero of Socialist Labor G. V. Zaitchenko, director of the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant and Deputy to the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet; and T. A. Gaidar, a Pravda correspondent.

The plenary session adopted a resolution on the question under discussion.

Comrade B. N. Pastukhov, Secretary of the Y.C.L. Central Committee, presented an announcement of measures for the participation of Young Communists and young people generally in the preparation for the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The plenary session approved the proposed measures. Organizational questions were also considered.

The plenary session released Yu. P. Belov from the duties of a member of the bureau of the Y.C.L. Central Committee in connection with his transfer to Party work. O. Ye. Cherkezia, First Secretary of the Georgian Y.C.L. Central Committee, was elected a member of the bureau of the Y.C.L. Central Committee. R. Kh. Abdullayeva, First Secretary of the Uzbekistan Y.C.L. Central Committee, was elected a candidate member of the bureau.

The plenary session removed T. A. Suuresaar from membership in the Y.C.L. Central Committee.

This concluded the work of the third plenary session of the Y.C.L. Central Committee.

March 1967

The Communist Party of Uruguay

The Communist Party of Uruguay (PCU) had its origin in a split within the Socialist Party of Uruguay. In 1920, at the Eighth Congress of the Socialist Party -- an affiliate of the Second International -- three-fourths of the approximately 1700 members voted to affiliate with the Moscow-led Third International and thus became the PCU.

The party made little progress during the 1920's and 1930's, though it developed a small following among labor groups. During and immediately after World War II the party extended its influence significantly, largely due to the prestige gained by the Soviet Union in its fight against Hitler's Nazis. However its post-war upsurge was short-lived; as the party more and more clearly revealed itself to be the creation of an international Communist movement diametrically opposed to the true interests of Uruguay, its supporters among the workers and the middle class began to drift away. However, following the death of Stalin, the party began to concentrate on exploiting domestic issues appealing to organized labor and other mass groups and its fortunes again improved. In 1955 the longtime (since 1920) Secretary General Eugenio Gomez Carreno, was expelled for "deviationism"; the fact that he was able to take only a handful of members out of the party with him is an indication of the strength of PCU discipline.

Since 1955 the PCU has tried to form a united leftist political front which it could dominate. In July 1962 it was successful in attracting some smaller revolutionary groups into an alliance known as the Leftist Liberation Front (Frente Izquierda de Liberacion -- FIDEL). Although the PCU especially has sought the cooperation of the Socialist Party, the latter group has repeatedly refused to join any electoral alliance with the Communists, fearing that their voice would be dominated by the PCU. The Party won 5% of the national vote in the 1946 elections, but its electoral strength fell off abruptly after that and averaged approximately 3% during the ensuing decade. However, in the elections of November 1966 it made a substantial gain, doubling its vote to 6% of the total. This increase can be largely attributed to the effective Communist exploitation of the economic slump which has characterized the Uruguayan economy for the past several years.

Party membership, not published by the PCU for several years, is estimated at 15,000 to 20,000. In addition, the Union of Communist Youth (UJC) has an estimated membership of about 8,000 or 10,000. The PCU is based almost entirely in urban areas, with a heavy concentration in Montevideo, whose population is half of the country's total of 2,750,000. The party finds its main membership among workers and exerts its major efforts in the field of labor. One of the chief sources of party strength has been its remarkably stable leadership. Following the overthrow of Gomez in 1955, Rodney Arismendi became and is still its principal leader. Many of the top party offices are still filled by the same people who filled them 10 and, in some cases, 20 years ago.

As mentioned above, a steady decline in Uruguay's economy since the mid-1950's has been a major basis for Communist growth. The bases of the difficulties may be characterized as: a public welfare system more lavish than the country can afford; excessive governmental intervention in and mismanagement of the economy; and a failure to increase productivity in line with spending. These problems in turn derived in good part from an unwieldy governmental system based on a nine-man governing council; this was changed by a constitutional reform, approved by the electorate in the November 1966 elections, which established a presidential system. Local and foreign observers are optimistic that the new single leadership, under President Oscar D. Gestido, will be able to deal effectively with the economic and political problems which face Uruguay.

Among the problems the new government will have to face is a steady decline in percapita gross domestic product of almost 1% annually over the past ten years. This is a result of falling markets for Uruguay's chief exports, wool, beef, and hides, and also of low productivity in the country's manufacturing industries. Falling production has meant a growing rate of unemployment, which has risen to about 12% of the total labor force of approximately one million. In addition, it is estimated that some 25% to 30% of the work force is underemployed. At the same time that the per capita product has been falling and unemployment has been rising, the nation has been suffering a soaring cost of living, which rose 38% in 1964, 85% in 1965, and an estimated 70% in 1966. Predictably, the result has been an unending series of strikes -- estimated at around 700 in the year preceding the elections of November of last year. Since one of the two major sources of strength of the PCU is organized labor (the other being teachers and students), it has both fomented and profited by these strikes.

Communist exploitation of worker discontent has increased in proportion to the economic decay. Until late 1965 the PCU followed a policy of keeping labor militancy within acceptable bounds in order not to provoke repressive government countermeasures. The party supported demands by independent unions, as well as by those it controlled, for improved working conditions and above all wage increases to match the inflation. The most severe labor crisis in many years occurred late in 1965 when the PCU changed its policy from one of caution to an active attempt to prolong labor tensions. Widespread strikes among bank employees and employees of the many autonomous government agencies led to emergency security measures by the government.

The turmoil came to a head in December 1965 when several leaders in the governmental council demanded that Uruguay break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union which, they asserted, was actively backing the wave of strikes. Significantly, labor's demands were immediately attenuated and it was possible for the government to lift its emergency security measures shortly thereafter. However the respite was only temporary. During 1966 labor tensions again built up. In mid-September the Communists were able to stage a general strike for purely political

purposes -- the first time this had been achieved. Early in October four Soviet officials were expelled from Uruguay for "intervening in labor affairs and inciting strikes." According to the Uruguayan Minister of Interior, Nicolas Storace, the Soviets were all members of the Soviet secret services. An official government memorandum stated that the objectives of the Soviets were: to precipitate labor paralysis through strikes and stoppages; to aggravate Uruguay's economic difficulties by disorganization of work, industrial sabotage and economic subversion; and to strengthen the position of Communist agents in labor unions. Although the strikes reached a climax just before the November elections, they havenot ceased since then. During the first months of 1967 strikes and stoppages reached a rate exceeding that of the previous year and involved public health workers, taxi drivers, bank employees, bus drivers, street cleaners, municipal employees, government workers, airport personnel, and weather bureau employees, among others.

The Communist hold on Uruguayan labor has been exercised principally through a general confederation which was first known as the General Union of Workers (UGT) and then as the Center of Uruguayan Workers (CTU), which was formed in April 1961. The Communists also organized another labor group, the National Workers' Convention (CNT), in 1964 to attract support from union groups that would not cooperate with the openly Communist-controlled CTU. At a Congress of Trade Union Unity, called by the Communist led unions in Montevideo from 28 September to 2 October 1966, the CTU and CNT merged into a nationwide labor confederation known as the National Workers' Central (Central Nacional de Trabajadores -- CNT), which has also gained the support of several independent unions. The confederation represents some 300,000 members -- which is one third of the nation's total work force and a major portion of all organized labor. While the PCU does not exercise absolute control over the CNT, it does have a very strong influence and is increasingly striving to augment its political influence among the unions organized in the CNT.

The second major base of strength of the PCU is among the students. The Communists, though few, dominate student policy through the use of classic Communist parliamentary maneuvers, through their militancy and superior organization, and by virtue of the fact that most Uruguayan students are indifferent to university politics, are inclined toward Marxism, and are disillusioned with democracy as practiced in Uruguay. By forming coalitions with other radical groups (such as leftwing Catholics, Socialists, Trotskyites, and others) they have been able to win key positions in the student political organization, the Federation of Uruguayan University Students (FEUU). The Secretary General of the FEUU, Horacio Bazzano, is a Communist. Party efforts have mainly been directed toward the University of the Republic of Uruguay, the country's only university, where 500 UJC members have considerable influence over the student body of 15,000.

Communist success in organizing secondary students has increased; there are some 8,000 UJC members in secondary schools. There are UJC

circles in most high schools, and Communist or Communist coalition candidates have won offices in many of them.

The PCU has also had considerable success in organizing primary and secondary school teachers. They control the principal primary school teachers' union; in the secondary schools the Communist-dominated union is smaller but more active.

Organized Communist activity among professional groups in Uruguay is carried on chiefly through the Association of Intellectuals, Artists, Reporters, and Writers. The association extends party influence by providing a meeting place outside the PCU for Communist intellectuals in the arts and professions. Its membership includes people prominent in national cultural activities. The Uruguayan Press Association, strongly influenced by the PCU, does not include the majority of top-level professional journalists, but does count most reporters of lower rank and nonprofessional workers and employees of both press and radio.

The Communists conduct extensive propaganda activities in Uruguay. The party newspaper, EL POPULAR (formerly known as Justicia) has a circulation of approximately 8,000. ESTUDIOS, another PCU publication, has a small circulation, but reaches an important number of students and intellectuals. A pro-Castro and pro-Communist newspaper, EPOCA, ceased publication in February 1967 as a result of the government's termination of a general subsidy to the press. In addition, a weekly publication, MARCHA, frequently supports Communist causes, though it is owned by a non-Communist. MARCHA has a wide circulation throughout the hemisphere and is very influential among students, professionals, and intellectuals. At least one publishing house, the United Peoples' Publications, specializes in Communist literature. The PCU and FIDEL also are able to use the RADIO NACIONAL extensively to present programs aimed at workers.

The Uruguayan Communist Party has been steadfastly pro-Soviet in the quarrels which have divided the Communist bloc in recent years. It has always had very close relations with the Soviet and Eastern European embassies in Montevideo, and PCU envoys are constantly travelling to the world Communist movement's gatherings. There could be no clearer evidence of its subservience to Soviet control than the circumstances surrounding the expulsion of the four Soviet diplomats in 1966.

The Uruguayan Communists are making a major effort to mobilize extensive propaganda and labor agitation against the "Summit Conference" of American presidents which will be held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 12 to 14 April 1967. The outlines of the PCU's intentions have been clearly proclaimed in the Communist press. EL POPULAR, for example, published an article on 11 March 1967 announcing the plans of the CNT against the "imperialist aggressors, assassins, dictators and "gorillas." In essence the CNT plans to expand labor agitation in order to create a tense political climate for the conference. At the same time the

propaganda campaign will be spearheaded by the UJC and will escalate as the conference date nears. The usual Communist tactics are to be expected: posters, wall writings, leaflets, strikes and sympathy strikes, protest marches, etc.

If the Communist plans succeed, they will have managed to give the impression outside Uruguay that the great mass of the Uruguayan people repudiates the entire conference. How false such an impression would be is evident from the inescapable fact that the PCU obtained only 6% of the vote last November. Those who realize that the party's political and propaganda strength are distortedly magnified by its influence among organized labor and students will be able to keep any such outburst in proper perspective.